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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Quantitative Man-Machine Model for Cyber Security 
Efficiency Analysis. (December 2005) 
Sung-Oh Jung, B.S., Dankook University; 
M.S., University of Southern California 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Jyh-Charn Liu  
         Dr. Hoh Peter In  
 
The analysis of security defense processes is of utmost importance in the 
management of various cyber-security attacks, which are increasing in scope and 
rapidity. Organizations need to optimize their resources based on a sound understanding 
of the level of their security defense processes’ efficiency and the impact of their 
investment.  
Modeling and characterization of the dynamics of cyber security management are 
essential to risk prediction, damage assessment, and resource allocations. This 
dissertation addresses the interactions between human factors and information systems. 
On the basis of the spiral life cycle model of software development processes, we 
develop a realistic, holistic security attack-defense model – Man-Machine Model (M3), 
which combines human factors and information systems’ (i.e., machine) states under an 
integrated analytical framework. M3 incorporates man and machine components. The 
man component is comprised of several variables such as Skill & Knowledge (SKKN) 
and Teamwork Quality (TWQ). The machine component is composed of variables such 
as traffic volume and the amount of downtime. M3 enables the analysis of intrusion 
detection and incident response process efficiency, i.e., security defense team 
performance.  
With data analysis, we formulate and test four major research hypotheses based 
on the data collected during security experiments. Through hypothesis testing, we 
evaluate regression models to estimate the security defense team performance (i.e. 
efficiency) at different levels of human intelligence (e.g., skill and knowledge) and 
 iv 
teamwork (e.g., teamwork quality). We assess the fitness and significance of the 
regression models, and verify their assumptions. Based on these results, organizations 
can hire those who have an appropriate level of skill and knowledge when it concerns 
investments to increase the level of skill and knowledge of security personnel. They also 
can attempt to increase the level of skill and knowledge of security personnel. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
Protection of critical information systems and global network infrastructure is an on-
going process that evolves around technologies, policies and procedures, and 
organizations in the view of business continuity and reputations. The Internet and 
network technologies allow users to enjoy a higher quality level of electronic 
communication and, thus, more efficient and convenient lives. However, due to the 
characteristics (such as openness) of the technologies enjoyed, security threats or 
vulnerabilities become commonplace for those who use them (especially in the case of 
the Internet). Any system without a connection to the Internet or any type of network is 
strong in terms of the protection of information; however, as soon as the system is 
hooked up to the Internet or other networks, it becomes vulnerable since it opens an 
enormous opportunity to those who want to break in the system; that is where the 
information assurance issues are born from.   
To protect valuable information from attackers, a Security Incident Response 
Team (SIRT) or at minimum a group of security personnel needs to be formed; however, 
forming a SIRT or security group is a difficult task due to constraints on budgets and 
resources; however, security breaching is expected to reduce when more resources are 
invested. In order to decide on the allocation of resources, such as human resources for 
information assurance, an organization must have knowledge of how the system and 
human groups (i.e. SIRT) interact.  
Obviously, technology is an important factor for security assurance; however, the 
installation of cutting-edge technology does not mean that systems are free from 
potential security threats or breaches. Grant Gross [28], a reporter for the IDG News 
Service, explains that, “Security is being more ingrained within the business and within 
daily operations … It's not just a technology solution any more -- you can't just throw a  
________ 
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering. 
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firewall in ... and the problem is solved. You have to address security from a people, 
processes, and technology standpoint in order to really have a successful security 
strategy in place.” In essence, the technology must accompany human groups to 
strengthen information assurance since it is human groups (i.e. SIRT) that implement the 
technology; people make the technology take effect and fulfill the goals of information 
security defense because they are the critical decision makers in the process. The basic 
role of a team is to defend against any type of security attack with their combined 
knowledge, experience, and interactions with the other team members. Thus, the effects 
of the security defense team’s defense efficiency (e.g. detection rates) and quality (i.e. 
teamwork quality or TWQ [33]) on the overall system status in emergency situations 
(e.g. security breaches) need to be analyzed.  
IT security guidelines [30] state potential problems that impede the ability to 
defend against security attacks include poor maintenance of IT systems and failure to 
install the available security updates. System administrators often do not install security 
updates promptly, and much of the damage caused by viruses or worms only becomes 
apparent some time after the existence of the pest (e.g. a security breach) has become 
known.  
A disastrous result of the potential people problem would be the Slammer worm 
[14], [71], which spread over the Internet (especially in many Asian countries such as 
Korea) on January 25, 2003. At unprecedented speed and scale, the worm paralyzed 
airline/train reservation systems, Internet shopping and banking, and information sharing 
and searching. The primary factor in this disaster is obviously the worm itself; however, 
human errors were evident. For instance, security patches were not installed, servers 
were not properly configured, and administrators could not coordinate their actions in an 
orderly fashion.  
J. E. Canavan [8] defines this kind of people problem as human vulnerabilities, 
and characterizes them as follows:    
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Human stupidity, carelessness, laziness, greed, and anger represent the greatest 
threats to networks and systems and will do more damage than the rest (system, 
physical, media, etc.) of the others combined. Moreover, human vulnerabilities and 
the risks associated with them are the most difficult to defend against. 
 
Recognizing the importance of people problem, i.e. human vulnerabilities, this 
dissertation proposes a quantitative Man-Machine Model (M3) to analyze the effects of 
human performance into security defense processes – intrusion detection and incident 
response. The proposed hybrid modeling approach can model systems or processes with 
hybrid natures that have both discrete and continuous characteristics. But, to the best of 
our knowledge, there has never been a study done on the hybrid modeling of man-
machine interactions for information assurance.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement  
This dissertation will address the problem of measuring the efficiency of security 
defense processes for the protection of Information Systems (IS). It is acknowledgeable 
that any system contains vulnerabilities which provide good starting points for various 
types of security attacks performed by malicious remote users (e.g. crackers) or insiders. 
Humans are another major variable in disastrous situations. Without understanding the 
interactions between systems and humans, it is not easy to find or eliminate the potential 
bottlenecks which reside in information security defense processes and reduce protection 
levels. The rationale of this study is to help create efficient resource allocations (e.g. 
systems and humans) while providing a better degree of IS protection. The following is 
the problem statement we pose to tackle throughout this study: 
 
How can we quantitatively measure the effects of key human factors on the intrusion 
detection and incident response process in terms of efficiency? 
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1.3. Research Questions 
Since we approach this study using a human-centric viewpoint, our primary focus is on 
how human performance can enhance the efficiency of the process of intrusion detection 
and incident response. Through our modeling and analysis work toward the 
measurement of human performance, we hope to present a guideline for human 
allocation problems in the management of security defense processes with a software 
engineering viewpoint. To draw this guideline, we begin with our primary research 
questions, which can be posed as:  (1) Where can human vulnerabilities occur? (2) What 
approach can be effective in handling them? Why? (3) What are the goals using such an 
approach? 
 
1.4. Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this dissertation is to derive quantitative models of security defense 
(intrusion detection and incident response) team performance. The models will be used 
to analyze the efficiency of the security defense team. The goal is achieved by 
developing the Man-Machine Model (M3) using a simulated attack (i.e., TCP SYN 
flooding Denial of Service (DoS) attack) and performing data analysis on the team 
performance using regression models.  
The benefits we expect to gain through this dissertation are as follows: 
• To develop a more realistic, holistic-view model of the security attack and 
defense process by incorporating group dynamics into the system. 
• To explore not only the vulnerabilities of system and technology, but the 
vulnerabilities of human groups (i.e. SIRT) as well. 
• To realize the relationship among key candidate variables and the conjectured 
security defense team performance variables. 
 
1.5. Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation presents a quantitative model to guide security managers’ decision 
making for better intrusion detection and incident response processes. Section 2 reviews 
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the background of information assurance and group behavior; that section also examines 
the efforts exhibited by industry or academic security people toward better intrusion 
detection and incident response. Section 3 presents the model components and a model 
example. Integrating these components, we create and examine a TCP SYN flooding 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack to show that the model can be used to represent the 
process of intrusion detection and incident response. Section 4 presents research 
hypotheses that we will test throughout this dissertation, and describes the security 
experiments including data collection, experimental setting, and process. Section 5 
presents the data analysis used to test the research hypotheses and analyze the efficiency 
of the security defense process; in that section we also present and verify necessary 
hypotheses assumptions. Section 6 summarizes this dissertation, and covers key 
contributions, discussions, and future work. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Security researchers and experts have pointed out the importance of intrusion detection 
and incident response for information assurance and risk management for more than 20 
years. Thus, many organizations developed thousands of security tools, algorithms, 
policies, etc., to protect themselves from malicious software and hackers. However, their 
main focus and efforts were not on the measurement of human performance to improve 
the efficiency of the security defense process; rather, they were focused on the systems 
or technology only. Without the measurement of human performance, it will be 
extremely hard to appropriately allocate human resources for the construction of good, 
solid information assurance programs.  
   
2.1. Information Assurance 
Assuring information systems in IT organization is crucial since information assets 
should not be leaked out to bad guys (i.e. security attackers) who can possibly use the 
assets for their own purposes, usually in an illegal way. To secure information systems, 
much research has been conducted including vulnerability assessment, which is one of 
the most important issues that one must address helping users determine the best 
approaches for preventing attacks [4]. In view of human-behavior modeling complexity, 
we must start with certain hypotheses about the different motivations of attackers, i.e. 
fame, money, and privacy [25], [26]. The approach proposed in [25], [26] is to reduce 
risk in software life cycles by using a software security assessment instrument.  
To protect the valuable information and monetary assets from attackers, a 
Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) or more generally an Incidence Response 
Team (IRT) would inevitably need to be formed; however, forming the SIRT or security 
group is a difficult task due to budget and resource constraints (e.g. human resources). 
Danny [78] addresses the issue by examining the roles of an IRT while stating that 
forming an IRT is a daunting task. Even if an IRT is commonly used to respond to 
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attacks in large software development or user organizations [90], [93], there are few 
descriptions of the behavioral dynamics that shape their actual behavior.  
 
2.2. Group Behavior 
Besides information assurance, group behavior is another field we study and apply in 
this dissertation research. Since good information assurance programs cannot be 
maintained by single-individual efforts, group behavior should be investigated. We hope 
that the application of group theory into this study enables us to approach a more 
realistic and effective program. We address the background - including importance - of 
these areas in this section.  
The importance of group (i.e. team) behavior-related issues has been long 
recognized in areas of behavioral, human, social, and organization sciences, etc. For 
instance, the importance of group decision-making brings the need for computerized 
decision support systems [36]. Efforts that measure important factors and rating scales in 
modeling group behavior and decision making have also been investigated by many 
researchers. Teamwork quality and team performance variables have been constructed 
by Hoegl and Gemuenden [33]; a rating scale for subjective workload assessment was 
defined by Hart and Staveland [29]; stress measurements were described and compared 
in [54], [42], [89], [9], [87], [47] and a social readjustment rating scale to measure stress 
was described by Holmes and Rahe [34]; a confidence scoring index for speech 
understanding systems is presented in [63] and various confidence measurements are 
introduced in [27], [64], [72]; a way to measure surprise is introduced in communication 
theory by Shannon [74] who claims that the amount of information is a measure of 
surprise and is closely related to the chance of one of several messages being transmitted. 
 
2.3. Security Modeling and Analysis 
Based on the knowledge of two major fields, this dissertation focuses on the 
measurement of human performance while considering system or technology issues to 
be important as well. To the best of our knowledge, this study is an innovative effort 
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[38], the first of its kind to integrate a machine-model with a man-model for improving 
the efficiency of the security defense process. A survey of the literature on the 
measurement of human performance shows that very little is done in the measurement of 
human performance for better security defense process. Even so, we present other’s 
work on security defense – intrusion detection and security defense – because their work 
also aims for better intrusion detection and incident responses, either partially or 
exclusively. We draw potential key contributions of this study from the observations of 
their work.   
Preventive security: Jonsson and Olovsson [44], [45] show an effort to model 
preventive security based on empirical data collected in the experiment. Based on the 
data, they formulate and test a statistical hypothesis that the times to breach are 
exponentially distributed. They come up with “a typical attacking process” (learning 
phase – standard attack phase – innovative attack phase) in a graph of ‘number of 
breaches’ vs. ‘time’ (both initially inexperienced attackers and initially experienced 
attackers). 
Operational security: Littlewood and Brocklehurst [51] address some 
quantitative aspects of operational security in an analogous manner to operational 
reliability. They raise several questions concerning a probability-based framework for 
operational security measurements in discussion.  
Another similar approach towards the measurement of operational security is 
presented in [7]. The approach is based on the analogy between system failure and 
security breach. To examine the raised issues, they conduct a pilot experiment to assess 
the feasibility of collecting data. Attackers, not defenders, fill out the reports during the 
experiment related to their attacking activity and breaches; the data collected is a mixture 
of quantitative (efforts) and qualitative (rewards). 
Ortalo and Deswarte [62] propose a theoretical model (privilege graph) that 
describes the system vulnerabilities in order to evaluate operational systems security. 
They also present a mathematical model to evaluate the mean effort for an attacker to 
reach the specified target, denoted as ‘mean effort to security failure’ (METF). 
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Intrusion scenario detection: A modeling work is presented in [18] with the 
objective of an intrusion scenario – an organized set of actions, which have to be 
executed by intruders following a certain order. Their model represents an attack, 
intrusion objective (final purpose of an intruder, which justifies all its actions) 
corresponding to security policy violation, domain rules, and intrusion scenarios. They 
introduce a notion of anti correlation, and claim that it is useful to recognize a sequence 
of correlated attacks that no longer enables intruders to achieve an intrusion objective.  
Probabilistic properties of computer audit data: Comparative studies on 
probabilistic properties of computer audit data that are important to intrusion detection 
are performed by Ye and Li [94]. The data of intrusive activities in an information 
system (consisting of host machines and communication links according to their 
definition) are generated with the simulation of 15 different intrusion scenarios. The 
authors provide answers to which properties of the data are necessary for intrusion 
detection by applying various techniques of detection such as Hotelling’s T2 test.  
Cost analysis and modeling: Wei and Frinke [85] perform a cost-benefit 
analysis for network intrusion detection systems with the objectives of (1) quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of security risks, and (2) construction of a cost model, which can 
be developed into an on-line system for real-time use. The cost model calculates the total 
costs of specific attacks. To test the model, attack data from network intrusion detection 
systems are gathered. 
Developing a data mining framework, Lee and Fan [49] build a cost-sensitive 
intrusion detection model and examine cost factors associated with IDS (Intrusion 
Detection System). One of the main objectives of their modeling work is to reduce the 
total expected cost, which is summed from operational and consequential costs.  
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3. PROPOSED WORK: MAN-MACHINE MODEL (M3) 
3.1. Petri Nets (PNs): A Conceptual Modeling 
To achieving the described objective, the main focus of our research employs the 
analysis of relationships between security defense team performance (e.g. detection 
rates) and human factors (e.g. TWQ), and the analysis of security defense team 
performance effects on the system resources. Before the analyses, we need to investigate 
the relationship between users (e.g. defenders), information systems, and attackers. For 
the purpose, we construct the Man-Machine Model (M3), which entails both a discrete 
event part and continuous part using Petri Nets (PNs) [55]. 
 Petri Nets (PNs) such as stochastic hybrid Petri-net models [65], [12], [20], [11] 
and simulation tools [16], [70], [84] have been developed in the control system area to 
represent, understand, and manipulate complicated states of system components. In this 
dissertation, our model approximates the positive and negative relationships commonly 
used in the man model. Our modeling approach is to develop basic components (e.g. 
continuous and discrete places/transitions) and their interconnections, i.e. firing rules for 
continuous-continuous, discrete-discrete, and continuous-discrete state transitions, so 
that he/she can freely develop his/her own models in his/her domains. 
 In a continuous model, marks are considered real quantities by subdividing whole 
marks into infinitesimally smaller parts (called “tokens”), whereas marks are treated as 
integers in a discrete model [12]. Even if the mere passing of time does not have a direct 
effect on the state of a discrete event model, general Petri-net models are extended to 
Discrete Petri Nets (DPNs) by introducing time variables in the firing vector, V, similar 
to the one proposed in [12]. In DPNs, state changes when a transition is fired are 
represented as: 
 
M(t+) = M(t)+ Cd •V(t)                                                                                        (1) 
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where M(t+), the next following marking function, is driven by the current marking 
function, M(t), according to the firing vector, V(t). The firing speed is represented by 
V(t).  M(t+) and M(t) are elements of a set of integer-number marking vectors M. The 
initial marking, M0, is defined by M(t) at time t = 0. Driven by an event, V(t) determines 
an instant transition with zero duration. Cd is an incident matrix of DPNs corresponding 
to the weights of the links (or arcs). Thus, in DPNs, the amount of marking change 
caused by a state change, M(t+) minus M(t), is Cd • V(t). 
        Several approaches to defining Continuous Petri-Nets (CPNs) are presented in [65], 
[12], [20], [11], [13], [67], depending on their compatibility with DPNs. Instead of firing 
the transitions at certain instances with zero duration, our approach is a continuous firing 
with flow V(M(t),t) that may be externally generated by an input signal and may also 
depend on the continuous marking vector M(t) [65]. The amount of marking change 
caused by a state change, in CPNs, is described as a nonlinear differential equation in (2) 
[65].   
 
)(tM&
 = Cc (M(t)) V(M(t),t),     M(t) ≥ 0           (2) 
 
where Cc is the incidence matrix corresponding to the continuous weights. A transition is 
continuously fired with flow speed, V(M(t),t), if the markings of all places in this 
transition are greater than zero. Note that (2) is a differential equation for representing 
the marking change amount. In order to represent positive and negative relationships in 
the man model, we use )(tM in& and )(tM out& (∈ )(tM& ), which change amounts in an input 
and output place, respectively. If )(tM in& )(tM out&  is greater than zero, the firing vector 
represents a positive relationship between a place and the following one; however, if 
)(tM in& )(tM out& is less than zero, it represents a negative relationship.  If )(tM in& )(tM out& is 
equal to zero, it means the states of one place or both places did not change, i.e. constant 
value at time t. Note that positive relationship means that the input flow amount of the 
following place increases (or decreases) as the output flow amount of the previous place 
increases (or decreases). Likewise, a negative relationship means that the input flow 
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amount of the following place decreases (or increases) as the output flow amount of the 
previous place increases (or decreases).  
Various interfaces between continuous and discrete models are shown in Figure 1. 
Continuous places (states) can be transformed into discrete places through state 
quantization techniques, or vice versa, as shown in Fig. 1 (a). For example, decision 
styles of vigilance are discrete states transformed from continuous states such as 
overconfidence, information process efficiency, stress, and preparedness. Different 
quantization techniques are used in this type of transformation. An example [65] of the 
simple quantization transformation is that the threshold of the intermediate arc (∆χ) 
decides the amount of the corresponding jump, and is used to interpret the discrete 
marking as a quantization of the continuous making. The development of quantization 
methods is beyond the scope of our focus in this dissertation. However, more 
sophisticated methods can be found in the literature, including fix-rate scalar 
quantization [Ree38], feedback vector quantization [DG81], multi-stage vector 
quantization [JG82], and universal quantization [Kie93]. The interface shown in Fig. 1 
(b) enables us to control the flow of continuous states by discrete states (just like 
“on/off” switches). Off-line or normal service modes shown in Fig. 2, for example, are 
discrete system states that can turn on or off continuous group factors such as 
information load.  Another type of interface shown in Fig. 1 (c) is used to represent 
discrete states affected by continuous states.  
 
DSNs CSNs
DSNsCSNs
χ
χ∆
  
activate de-activate
DSNs
C SN s
off-line
norm al operation
D SN sC SNs
χ∆
 
                (a)                                                  (b)                                            (c) 
Fig. 1. Interfaces between CPNs and DPNs [38] 
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3.2. Machine Modeling 
A key to our modeling of system (i.e. machine) behavior is achieving scalability for the 
simulation and computation of analytical models. For our purposes, it is neither practical 
nor necessary to fully capture the details of the software (e.g. intrusion detection tool) 
development or its operations. In its simplest form, we assume that three major types – 
deployment, operation, and analysis - are needed to characterize the major activities 
related to an information system (see Fig. 2).  In the machine model, the information 
system can be a business application suite, a server with an operating system (e.g. Linux), 
or even an attack-monitoring tool. The deployment phase – which can also be considered 
as the preparation phase – can be further refined into multiple stages such as learning 
and installation. The operation phase can be formed in one of the three states: off-line, 
normal, or non-normal. The non-normal states are expected to lower business utility and 
are generalized as “degraded modes”. Case by case, each state would have multiple input 
variables that would affect the state transitions and/or the information system’s security 
assurance. The analysis phase is when the system and attack-related data are analyzed by 
the security defense team. As needed, the machine model can be scaled to add more 
stages.  
After the state configuration for a system is defined, the next step is the creation 
of state transitions and their firing rules.  Users use different applications to access data 
and/or to affect other applications or systems; intruders use similar behavior to launch 
attack programs. Their behavior determines the state transitions, including the creation 
and destruction of various states. It is fairly easy to simulate system behavior using a 
wide array of simulation and analytical tools – for example, stochastic/hybrid Petri Nets 
where state transitions and control or data flow can be represented according to 
distributions of significant events such as security attacks.  
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Fig. 2. A high-level machine model connected to the group model for information 
assurance [38] 
 
3.3. Man Modeling 
Current research on defender behavior treats a SIRT (Security Incident Response Team) 
as if it were a smoothly operating machine. In real-world situations, however, SIRTs 
vary greatly in terms of preparedness, ability to work together, and overall fitness of the 
team to rise to the challenge presented by the attackers.  An adequate model of a defense 
will have to incorporate these human factors; otherwise, an important source of errors 
and costs will be omitted.   
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Two main characteristics of attack behavior considered in the Man-Machine 
Model are attack frequency and creativity. While there is no definitive model of intruder 
behavior, the work by Jonsson and Olovsson [44], [45] suggests that attack frequency 
follows an exponential distribution.  We assume that creativity — directly correlated to 
attack severity — follow a normal distribution.  On the basis of these two assumptions, 
we build a black box model of attack behavior, which is sufficient given our focus on 
SIRTs.  
We assume that a SIRT will be formed explicitly in response to attacks.  Such 
teams are commonly discussed in the literature on cyber incidents [90] and network 
forensics [93]. To determine how teams contribute to the defense in the Man-Machine 
Model, it is necessary to develop a model of group (team) dynamics that determine the 
development rate for detection (and response) and quality of the detection (and response).  
Our man model is presented in Fig. 3.   
One of the key variables in the model is Teamwork Quality (TWQ) [33], which 
refers to the degree to which the team members communicate, coordinate, support, make 
an effort, and act cohesively together. That is, it is a measure for the quality of 
collaboration in teams. As the description explains, it is comprised of five factors (one 
factor is under investigation for adoption). Communication measures how frequent the 
team members communicate directly and personally with each other, whether or not they 
have mediators through whom much of the communication is conducted, etc.; 
coordination measures how closely harmonized the work done on sub-tasks within the 
experiment project was, etc.; mutual support measures the ease and speed with which 
conflicts were resolved when they came up, etc.; effort measures how high a priority the 
project was for each team member, etc.; cohesion measures how important project 
involvement was for each team member, etc.  
A system of factors influences the TWQ enacted by the team.  Perceived mental 
workload (PCMW) is the degree to which the team is under physical, mental, and 
temporal demands. It also includes frustration level, performance satisfaction level, and 
mental and physical effort level. Preparedness (PRPD) is the degree to which the team is  
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Fig. 3. Man model  
 
ready to deal with attacks.  Stress (STRS) is the mean level of negative arousal the team 
has.  Overconfidence (OVCF) is the degree to which the team assumes it can handle any 
problem without much difficulty.   
Tracing the system to the determinants of the four factors, Perceived Mental 
Workload (PCMW) has a positive linear relationship with Objective Information Load 
(OBIN) (the amount of cues and messages to be processed) in an inverted-U curve.  The 
number of prior attacks is positively related to Perceived Mental Workload (PCMW), as 
the team members are “on edge” and ready to recognize attacks. As attacks are fewer, 
the team is less likely to be ready to recognize cues signaling an attack. Both Objective 
Information Load and Stress increase in a positive linear manner by Surprise.  Objective 
Information Load increases because Surprise causes the team to scan for information, 
picking up many relevant and irrelevant items. Stress increases because Surprise arouses 
the team.   
 
 
teamwork 
   quality 
response_qty 
perc_ment_wkload 
stress 
obj_info_load 
num_prev_evt 
surprise 
+ 
+ - 
+ 
+ 
response_rate num_cur_evt 
+ 
+ 
add 
num_ini_evt 
+ 
+ 
+ 
detection_rate 
+ 
+ 
+ 
defense_qty 
+ 
- 
discrete 
continuous 
training 
+ 
+ 
skill_and_knowledge 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
understanding 
 
+ 
 17 
Preparedness has a positive linear relationship with Training (TRNG).  Teams 
that train for attacks are more likely to be prepared than those that do not. Stress reduces 
Preparedness in a negative linear fashion because of Stress reactions. Surprise is a 
conduit for two indirect effects on Stress. The number of previous attacks reduces 
Surprise; other things being equal, teams that have experienced prior attacks are less 
likely to be surprised.  Also, Preparedness reduces Surprise as well, for obvious reasons. 
Overconfidence is a positive function of Prior Success, which is a function of Quality of 
Response.  Teams that have handled problems effectively in the past tend to become 
confident.  This is not a problem except for the high range of Confidence 
(Overconfidence). 
Providing appropriate training and education is often critical to the successful 
implementation of information security within an organization [5], [6]. Without 
appropriate training or education to every personnel (including security staff), success in 
information security can not be expected. In this dissertation, we consider training only. 
Training, as another key variable, has a goal of building knowledge and skills to 
facilitate the job performance [88]. Therefore, training is assumed to have a positive 
relationship with Skill and Knowledge (SKKN). The more trained the security staff, the 
more they can gain skills and knowledge associated with current security issues. 
However, allocating an appropriate amount of time and money for training is all too 
often overlooked as a requirement for preventing stagnation of staff expertise, but 
training is absolutely essential for keeping those skills current with technology issues 
[91]. Without keeping the skills and knowledge up-to-date with current issues, it is hard 
to effectively and efficiently respond against different kinds of security incidents. That is 
one of the benefits which training can provide.  
Not only can training can have a positive impact on skill and knowledge, but it 
can reduce the errors made by different types of users - including system administrators. 
The usually forgotten but important factor of Human Error is emphasized by Schultz 
and Shumway [73], stating that, “Granted, the incident could be very serious and 
potentially costly, but human error costs organizations far more than security-related 
 18 
incidents do.” An example of human error is input errors and omissions. According to 
the National Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, 1991 Annual 
Report [56], errors and omissions are top rated in the economic loss attributed to this 
threat. These errors are caused by many types of users such as end users, system 
operators, and programmers. A sound awareness and training program can help an 
organization reduce the number and severity of errors and omissions, which are an 
important threat to data and system integrity [58]. 
Skill and Knowledge (SKKN), as another key variable, poses a solid impact on 
Detection Rate (DTR) and Response Rate (RPR), for obvious reason. During a research 
committee meeting, two experienced network/system administrators in the Computer 
Science Department at Texas A&M University asserted that skill sets and knowledge are 
extremely important in security-related attack detection and response. To measure skill 
sets and knowledge, we should have SKKN that covers both skill sets and knowledge.  
 
3.4. Example: TCP SYN Flooding Denial of Service (DoS) Attack  
This section presents a hybrid man-machine interaction model for a TCP SYN flooding 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack using the proposed model. The hybrid TCP SYN 
flooding attack model is composed of three model components: monitoring, control, and 
group behavior modules. The monitoring module shown in Fig. 4 (a) models the process 
of monitoring the input traffic patterns of service systems from the Internet using a 
backward propagation feedback control algorithm, presented in [92], as an initial 
intrusion detection process. The algorithm detects abnormal traffic patterns, called “hot 
spots,” inside a machine (upper dot-line box) shown in Fig. 4 (a-1) and outside the 
machine (bottom dot-line box) shown in Fig. 4 (a-2). Total traffic rate (total_traff_rate) 
is determined by these two inputs.  
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The control module depicted in Fig. 4 (b) is used to control the throttle of 
network (throttling_on/off) via traffic a control indicator (under_attack/normal) for the 
real system states through human verification of a TCP SYN flooding attack. The 
verification is performed based on total traffic rate in the monitoring module. Through 
the notification transition (notify) to the control module, if the TCP SYN flooding attack 
really happened, the systems’ state is changed to ‘under attack’ (i.e. pass a token into 
under_attack). Under attack, administrators turn on the throttling to reduce network 
traffic (i.e. pass a token in throttling_on from throttling_off) to block suspicious packets. 
This is one of degraded modes under attack, as shown in Fig. 2. 
The group behavior module is presented in Fig. 4 (c), which interacts with the 
system modules such as the control module. Typical group behavior or to-do list under a 
TCP SYN flooding attack is explained in [15]. The administrators verify potential victim 
systems when the monitoring software makes warning flags, then identify, test, install, 
and execute effective defense mechanisms. If a large number of systems (measured by 
num_cur_atk) is attacked at the same time, both information load (info_load) and 
surprise of administrators increases, and they finally affect the decision style.  
Based on three styles of the decisions, quality of response (quality_response) and 
rate of response development (development_rate_ for_response) are determined, which 
are themselves key factors in how effectively the group responded with defensive 
mechanisms and how fast the systems can get back to normal operations by deactivating 
the throttling from on to off (i.e. moving a token from throttling_on to throttling_off), 
respectively. 
 A PN tool to support hybrid PNs, called Visual Object Net ++ [22], is used to 
develop the example. The tool supports mixed continuous and discrete event PNs.  
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Fig. 4. M3: A PN modeling diagram  
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3.5. Research Focus 
Our modeling aims at a tradeoff analysis between resource allocations and the impact of 
team performance (efficiency). To make more accurate decisions, organizations should 
consider the most critical and impacting factors to team efficiency factors: Detection 
Rate (DTR) and Response Rate (RPR). Based on the current literature and experts’ 
opinions, those critical factors include Skill and Knowledge (SKKN), Training (TRNG), 
and Teamwork Quality (TWQ). Thus, we shift focus to these three factors to measure 
team efficiency throughout this dissertation. Our research focus throughout this 
dissertation is summarized in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Research focus 
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4. EXPERIMENTS 
4.1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of security personnel is statistically 
significantly related to the Detection Rate (DTR) 
Hypothesis 2: Training (TRNG) and Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of security personnel 
are statistically significantly related to the Response Rate (RPR) 
Hypothesis 3: High-SKKN level groups provide better detection (i.e. faster detection 
rate) than Medium-SKKN level groups 
Hypothesis 4: High-TRNG level groups provide better response (i.e. faster response 
rate) than Medium-TRNG level groups  
 
The first hypothesis sets Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) as independent variable and 
Detection Rate (DTR) as dependent variable. In other words, SKKN is linearly (or 
nonlinearly) related to DTR. This hypothesis is derived from the experience of two 
network/system administrators in the Computer Science Department at Texas A&M 
University; they assert that both trust and skill sets (and knowledge) are among the most 
important factors in security-related attack detection and response.  
The second hypothesis, also as important as the first, is that Training (TRNG) 
and Skill and Knowledge (SKKN), and Response Rate (RPR) are dependent. This 
hypothesis is derived from current literature and other sources, including two 
network/system administrators in the Computer Science Department at Texas A&M 
University. ISO/IEC 17799 [5], [6] claim that providing appropriate training and 
education is often critical to the successful implementation of information security 
within an organization. A NIST Handbook [58], in a similar manner, states that a sound 
awareness and training program can help an organization reduce the number and severity 
of errors and omissions, which are an important threat to data and system integrity. 
This hypothesis is as important as the first one since according to the degree of 
effect of Training and Skill Sets and Knowledge on security personnel’s performance 
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(i.e. detection rate) each organization may revise its decisions on spending money on (1) 
their own training programs, and (2) human resource allocations in the hope of 
improving the level of security defense in both detection and response.  
 
4.2. Experimental Setting 
Week-long security experiments were held twice in 2003 (April 11 through 18) and 2004 
(April 16 through 23). With the help of Dr. Michael Grimaila, who taught the Business 
Information Security course (INFO689) at Texas A&M University, Dr. Marshall Scott 
Poole, Dr. Hoh Peter In, and me set up the security experiments at the Security Lab 
(324E), located at the Department of Information & Operations Management (INFO). 
 The human subjects as defenders were graduate students enrolled in INFO689.  In 
the spring of 2003, we had six different groups of three to four students. Similarly in 
2004, we had five different groups containing three to four students.  There were two 
types of human subjects – either technical or managerial. Technical people worked 
mostly on setting up the experiments and were actively involved in the experiments.  
Meanwhile, managerial people worked mostly on planning a security budget, 
establishing security policies, and documenting their work. This is because these 
experiments were linked together with their own security project in INFO 689. 
 The attackers were students enrolled in the Advanced Networks and Security 
course (CPSC665). Attackers at the Department of Computer Science were called the 
Black Team; as a part of their job throughout the class, they were instructed to launch 
security attacks against the defense groups at the INFO Department. The organization of 
the Black Team was not known to the defenders.  
 However, both defenders and attackers had to follow certain rules, which are 
presented in Appendix B. The rules were experimental rules applied to every subject 
participating in the security experiments; however, they were general rules – and may be 
common to other security experiments. The rules instructed participants on how and how 
often to fill out the data collection forms we provided. Since these experiments were part 
of their original job in their class exercise, they had their own rules to follow as well as 
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the rules given by us. Defenders at INFO Department had read and obeyed the rules, 
made up by their class instructor, including goals, initial conditions, objectives, and 
rewards. Attackers in the CS Department had their own lab policies and procedures [66] 
as well.  
 Both defenders and attackers used intrusion detection tools and hacking tools, 
respectively. Each defense group might have its own preference over the tools it uses. 
However, generally speaking, the security tools installed (loaded) in each group’s 
computers were Bastille Linux Firewall, TripWire, Nessus, and Nmap. Some groups 
installed other tools as well, including Snort, Ethereal, Rootkit Checker, and Logcheck. 
While each group had different kinds of tools loaded into its system, every group 
was loaded with the Redhat Linux as its OS. However, due to preference differences, 
each group had a different version of Redhat Linux (generally, version 7.3 or 8.0). The 
system of each group was also loaded with various services, such as Web services. Thus, 
each system had installed Web, SSH, FTP, NFS, Email, DNS, News, and Database 
servers. Every system had Apache as its Web server and MySQL as its Database server, 
even if systems were running different versions. 
 
4.3. Experimental Process 
The protocol for these experiments, presented in Appendix A, guided the students on 
how to participate in the experiments and record demographic information and what they 
did throughout the entire week. As the experiment coordinator, I followed the protocol 
and helped the students to fill out the forms we distributed. Whenever they had questions, 
they were directed to contact me by phone or email in order to receive prompt answers. 
Since poor or improper responses on the forms was a concern, participants were 
systematically taught how to best fill out the forms (content and intervals) using 
examples. The defenders were directed to fill out five different forms – Background, 
Preparation, Activity Record, Teamwork Quality, and Post-defense forms, as displayed 
in Appendix D. Before the security experiments begin, they were directed to fill out 
Background and Preparation forms. During the experiments, they were directed to fill 
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out Activity Record and Teamwork Quality forms. After the experiments, they were 
directed to fill out Post-defense form. 
 After the defenders had the concepts of what they could do, the security 
experiments began. As soon as the experiments began, the defenders were busy in 
performing their job – protection of their systems and information. Their working hours 
toward this experimental job varied according to their other class schedules and 
willingness. For each activity they undertook during the period they worked, they 
recorded it on the Activity Record form when they detected or found a suspicious event 
or problem. They recorded the time they found the problem, the nature of the problem, 
and the way they found the problem. They recorded if they think the problem a 
suspicious security attack incidents, and they were asked to record why they think so. 
For a response activity, they recorded what actions they took as a reaction against the 
suspicious problem, what time they took the actions, and why they did. 
 Besides, they recorded any other activity not mentioned in the activity of detection 
and response that could be significant. Sources of information they received during that 
activity and type of the activity were also recorded. Examples of sources could be 
‘/etc/initd.conf’, ‘snort log’, etc. Example of type are email, phone calls, hearing from 
team members (off-line), discussion (off-line), electronic bulletin board such as Yahoo 
Messenger, and other types. In addition to sources and type, they recorded the number of 
messages and phase (e.g., detection phase). They also recorded downtime they had 
during the period they worked. The downtime was recorded based on sources – server, 
system (computer), service, network, application, etc. They recorded time duration that a 
downtime occurred, and the reasons.  
 While they were working for detection of any suspicious event or problem, they 
were directed to fill out the information regarding how they worked together on 
Teamwork Quality form, so that we can better understand how they worked as an 
incident response team.  They recorded the degree, to which they were surprised during 
the experiments due to the security attack incidents they found, on a scale of 1 (not 
surprised at all) to 10 (extremely surprised), and the confidence level each team member 
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had for their team based on beliefs about the team performance, on a scale of 1 (to no 
extent) to 5 (to a great extent). Stress level they had during the period they worked was 
recorded based on fifteen judgments – demanding, pressured, hectic, calm, relaxed, 
many things stressful, pushed, irritating, under control, nerve-wrecking, hassled, 
comfortable, more pressure than I’d like, smooth running, and overwhelming. Level of 
vigilance, describing how their team worked together when they made decisions or solve 
detected problems, were recorded on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Perceived mental workload, composed of six subcomponents (mental demand, physical 
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level) was recorded on a 
scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high).  
 Teamwork quality variables [33] which represent teamwork quality of their team 
during the period they worked were also recorded on Teamwork Quality Form.  They 
include communication, coordination, cohesion, efforts, mutual support, and balance of 
member contributions.  
While they were working in the lab by participating in their security experiments 
and filling out two forms – Activity Record and Teamwork Quality Forms, I checked 
their activity by visiting the lab in which the security experiments were held. Whenever 
they had questions regarding the forms, I gave them succinct and accurate answers. In 
case the forms were not available, I created additional copies and put them in the lab. 
Since the lab was guarded by a secretary and the instructor, we didn’t lose any 
completed forms. 
 I collected all the data forms after each security experiments week ended. 
Additionally, I obtained the students’ log files thanks to the instructor’s help.  The 
students’ log files were expected to be useful to check out what tools each team used in 
the experiments, who participated, what their roles were, and most importantly the 
existence of missing information from their data forms.  
After collecting their data forms, I found out that there were complexities in 
collecting considerable amounts of meaningful data from defenders. The experiments 
were a complex event. While defenders worked for detecting any suspicious events or 
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problems and responding against them whenever detecting, they had to fill out two 
forms simultaneously as well as they secured their e-commerce web servers so that the 
web servers would not be compromised from attack incidents. In other words, they 
performed not only filling out two data forms for our data collection purpose, but 
secured and managed web servers for their own class project. Even data form filling 
could be a daunting task for defenders because they had to answer many question items 
on the forms with vigilance and quickness, and in addition, it took some time for them to 
get a concept of all the question items. Besides, I could rarely meet them in the Lab since 
all the defenders had their own schedule.   
As a result of complexities of security experiments and data form filling, 
unpleasant things occurred. For instance, sometimes, they filled out the Teamwork 
Quality form appropriately, but they forgot to fill out the Activity Record form, which 
should have been filled out simultaneously. Often, they failed to provide important data 
– especially timing data – while successfully filling out the rest of a form. In these cases, 
their log files would have helped me check out against their original data forms; 
however, they were usually not helpful, meaning I rarely found the missing information 
in their log files either.  
I could collect only 22 (15 and 7 from 2003 and 2004, respectively) meaningful 
data out of two-time security experiments due to complexities of experiments and data 
form filling, and carelessness of defenders, etc. The data collected are explained and 
analyzed in detail in the next section; and, suggestions on much more meaningful data 
collection are presented in Section 6.3. 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1. Data Collection 
Both the technical and managerial people participated in the security experiments and 
filled out the forms we provided. Table 1 represents those who not only participated in 
the experiments but filled out the given data forms with the inclusion of performance-
related data (e.g. detection time), which was a must. It represents the year they 
participated in the security experiments, each subject’s group name, his/her code number 
(which were given for the purpose of his/her anonymity), his/her role in the duration of 
the experiments, and his/her type – either technical or managerial.  
Out of twenty two samples collected, only three data were the ones filled out by 
managerial people who might not be able to provide meaningful information. However, 
since these experiments are not for individual project-type experiments, it is quite 
possible they may have asked their team members about what happened, what actions 
they took, and how they were supposed to react, and so on. This reasoning became a 
reality when I discussed issues with both managerial and technical people after the 
experiments. Thus, even if not all the data came from the technical people, we accepted 
all completed forms provided for the data analysis. However, whenever we found 
something odd, especially in hypothesis testing, we could eliminate the data for better or 
accurate analysis. 
For the hypothesis testing and regression analysis, we collected the empirical 
data, both original and weighted (both are displayed in Table 2 and 3, respectively). The 
collected data were used to construct statistical models of intrusion detection and 
incident analysis for the efficiency of the security defense process. SAS regression 
analysis was used on the data. The regression analysis was also used to test the 
hypotheses we presented in Section 4.  
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TABLE 1 
Human Subjects and Their Roles 
 
year group name  code number role tech/mngr 
1 T 
1 security programmer T 
16 server administrator T Alpha 
17 security budget & policy analyst N 
3 T 
3 networking specialist T Bravo 
11 team leader T/N 
6 policy group N 
7 T 
7 tech group T Charlie 
8 policy group N 
4 project manager T/N 
9 system administrator T 
10 team leader T/N 
2003 
Echo 
18 security officer T 
Charlie 3M technical leader T 
2A technical/security analyst T 
2A technical/security analyst T Echo 
2K technical administration T 
2F technical/policy maker T/N 
2G technical administrator T 
2004 
Golf 
3O technical T 
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TABLE 2 
Original Data 
 
Skill & Knowledge Training   
          
system 
experien
ce 
security 
experie
nce & 
knowle
dge 
security 
training 
other 
traini
ng 
security 
project 
understa
nding 
numb
er of 
tools 
vigila
nce 
teamwo
rk 
quality 
detect
ion 
rate 
respo
nse 
rate 
6 2 3 2 3 1 3.7 4.7 1   
6 2 3 2 3 1 3.6 4.7 0.1 0.1 
5 1 3 1 4 1 4.2 4.9 0.1 0.1 
3 1 3 2 2 1 4.5 5.3 0.1 0 
6 1 3 1 5 1 4.8 5.7 1 0.2 
6 1 3 1 5 1 5 5.9 1 0.2 
3 1 3 6 3 1     0.1 1 
2 1 3 1 4 3     0.2 0 
1 1 3 1 3 3 4.8 5.5 0.1 0.1 
1 1 3 1 3 3 4.5 5.2 0.1 0 
1 1 3 1 4 3 4.5 5.1 0.2 0 
3 1 3 1 1 1 4.3 4.9 0.2 0.1 
3 3 3 3 2 1 4.2 5.3 0.1 0.1 
3 1 3 3 3 1 4.1 4.3 0.1 0 
2 1 3 1   1 5 4.8 0 1 
2 1 3 1 5 5 4.2 4.7 0 0.1 
6 6 4 2 5 5 3.7 4.6 1 1 
6 6 4 2 5 5 3.7 4.6 1 1 
1 2 4 3 4 5 3.9 4.4 0 1 
1 1 3 1 5 4 3.9 5.2 0   
3 1 5 3 5 4 5 5.9 0   
3 1 3 4 5 4 5 5.9 0   
 
 
 
5.2. Measurement 
Skill & Knowledge (SKKN) is a compound variable of skill and knowledge. Skill is 
defined as the ability to do something well, especially through learning and practice; 
knowledge is defined as understanding one has obtained, especially through learning or 
experience. In our context, SKKN is the ability to perform well protection of information 
systems such as web servers and understanding one has obtained through various 
experience or learning. It was measured by having human subjects indicate the number 
of months they had experience with systems such as UNIX and LINUX, and the number  
 31 
TABLE 3 
System Experience Scale 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Security Experience and Knowledge Scale 
 
 
 
 
of months of security experience and knowledge they had. The number of months they 
had experience with systems, presented in Table 3, are rated on the scale of one to six. 
The number of months of security experience and knowledge they had, presented in 
Table 4, are rated on the scale of one to six. 
Since relevance of Security experience and knowledge to SKKN could be 
assumed to be greater than that of System experience to SKKN, a weight of 0.3 was 
given to System experience, and 0.7 to Security experience and knowledge. The 
weighted System experience, Security experience and knowledge, and their summed 
value of SKKN are shown in Table 7. 
 Training (TRNG) is defined as the level of training experience which includes both 
off-line (e.g., class, seminars. conferences, telephone, etc.) and on-line (e.g., internet, e-
mail, etc.) training experience. It was measured by having human subjects indicate the 
number of months they had experience with security training, and the number of months 
of they had experience with other training. The number of months they had experience 
with security training, presented in Table 5, are rated on the scale of one to six. 
 
 
System 
Experience 1: <= 6 mo 
2: <= 12 
mo 
3: <= 24 
mo  
4: <=36 
mo 5: <= 60 
6: >60 
mo 
Security 
Experience and 
Knowledge 
1: <= 0.5 
mo 
2: <= 2 
mo 
3: <= 6 
mo  
4: <=12 
mo 5: <= 24 
6: >24 
mo 
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TABLE 5 
Security Training Scale 
 
Security training 
1: <= 0.5 
mo 
2: <= 2 
mo 
3: <= 4 
mo  
4: <=6 
mo 
5: <= 
12 
6: >12 
mo 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Other Training Scale 
 
Other training 1: <= 1 mo 
2: <= 4 
mo 
3: <= 12 
mo  
4: <=24 
mo 
5: <= 
48 
6: >48 
mo 
 
 
 
The class – INFO689 – they took was counted four months of security training 
experience because the class could be considered security training. The number of 
months of they had experience with other training, presented in Table 6, are rated on the 
scale of one to six. 
Other training includes network or system training that could be useful to 
perform security experiments.  Relevance of Security training to TRNG is greater than 
that of Other training to TRNG, a weight of 0.7 was given to Security training, and 0.3 to 
Other training. The weighted security training and other training, and their summed 
value of TRNG are shown in Table 7. 
 Security project understanding was measured by having human subjects indicate 
the degree to which they understand the project they will perform in security 
experiments, on a scale of 1 (little understanding) to 5 (thorough understanding). The 
detailed description of each scale is shown in Appendix D. Security project understating 
data values are shown in Table 7. 
 The number of tools was measured by having human subjects indicate how many 
security tools their team installed on their systems to use as tools for protecting their 
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systems. The tools include Bastille Linux Firewall, Tripwire, Nessus, Nmap, Ethereal, 
Rootkit Checker, etc. The number of tools data values are shown in Table 7.  
 Vigilance was measured by having human subjects indicate how their team works 
together as they decide or solve detected problems, on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
6 (strongly agree).  Subjects indicated their degree of agreement with ten statements as 
its measurements, which are shown in Appendix D. Vigilance data values are shown in 
Table 3.  
Teamwork Quality (TWQ) [33] was measured by having human subjects indicate 
the degree their team performed their tasks together. TWQ, a complex variable, is 
composed of six facets (communication, coordination, cohesion, effort, mutual support, 
and balance of member contributions) [33] which have same scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), but have different measurements. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of TWQ facets were 0.91 [33], which are excellent according to a rule of 
thumb [24]. Due to the high reliability of measurements, we chose the variable for our 
research.  Communication measures if there is sufficiently frequent, informal, direct, and 
open communication. Coordination measures if individual efforts are well structured and 
synchronized within the team. Cohesion measures if team members are motivated to 
maintain the team, and if there is team spirit. Effort measures if team members exert all 
their efforts to the team’s tasks. Mutual effort measures if team members help and 
support each other in carrying out their tasks. Balance of member contributions measures 
if all team members are able to bring in their expertise to their full potential. 
Measurements of six facets are shown in Appendix D. TWQ data values are shown in 
Table 7. 
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TABLE 7 
Weighted Data 
 
weigh
ed 
syste
m 
experi
ence 
weigh
ed 
securi
ty 
experi
ence 
& 
knowl
edge 
skill 
& 
knowl
edge 
total 
value 
weigh
ted 
securi
ty 
traini
ng 
weigh
ted 
other 
traini
ng 
traini
ng 
total 
value 
securi
ty 
projec
t 
under
standi
ng 
numb
er of 
tools 
vigila
nce 
team
work 
qualit
y 
dete
ctio
n 
rate 
resp
ons
e 
rate 
1.8 1.4 3.2 2.1 0.6 2.7 3 1 3.7 4.7 1   
1.8 1.4 3.2 2.1 0.6 2.7 3 1 3.6 4.7 0.1 0.1 
1.5 0.7 2.2 2.1 0.3 2.4 4 1 4.2 4.9 0.1 0.1 
0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 0.6 2.7 2 1 4.5 5.3 0.1 0 
1.8 0.7 2.5 2.1 0.3 2.4 5 1 4.8 5.7 1 0.2 
1.8 0.7 2.5 2.1 0.3 2.4 5 1 5 5.9 1 0.2 
0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.8 3.9 3 1     0.1 1 
0.6 0.7 1.3 2.1 0.3 2.4 4 3     0.2 0 
0.3 0.7 1 2.1 0.3 2.4 3 3 4.8 5.5 0.1 0.1 
0.3 0.7 1 2.1 0.3 2.4 3 3 4.5 5.2 0.1 0 
0.3 0.7 1 2.1 0.3 2.4 4 3 4.5 5.1 0.2 0 
0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 0.3 2.4 1 1 4.3 4.9 0.2 0.1 
0.9 2.1 3 2.1 0.9 3 2 1 4.2 5.3 0.1 0.1 
0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 0.9 3 3 1 4.1 4.3 0.1 0 
0.6 0.7 1.3 2.1 0.3 2.4   1 5 4.8 0 1 
0.6 0.7 1.3 2.1 0.3 2.4 5 5 4.2 4.7 0 0.1 
1.8 4.2 6 2.8 0.6 3.4 5 5 3.7 4.6 1 1 
1.8 4.2 6 2.8 0.6 3.4 5 5 3.7 4.6 1 1 
0.3 1.4 1.7 2.8 0.9 3.7 4 5 3.9 4.4 0 1 
0.3 0.7 1 2.1 0.3 2.4 5 4 3.9 5.2 0   
0.9 0.7 1.6 3.5 0.9 4.4 5 4 5 5.9 0   
0.9 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.2 3.3 5 4 5 5.9 0   
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Detection Rate (DTR) was measured by calculating one over the detection time, 
which is equal to the time when human subjects detected any suspicious event or 
problem minus the time when they began working. DTR is between zero and one. DTR 
data values are shown in Table 7. Similarly, Response Rate (RPR) was measured by 
calculating one over the response time, which is equal to the time when human subjects 
reacted against any detected problem minus the time when they detected. Like DTR, 
Response rate (RPR) is between zero and one. RPR data values are shown in Table 7. 
 
5.3. Correlation Analysis 
Several potential candidates for the independent variables are presented here. To assess 
how strongly each independent variable statistically related to the dependent variables, 
we performed a correlation analysis. Results of correlation analysis between the 
independent and dependent variables are presented in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8 
Summary of the Correlation Analysis Results 
 
  SKKN TRNG UDST NOTL VIGL TWQ DTR RPR 
SKKN 1        
TRNG 0.289791 1       
UDST 0.226678 0.187006 1      
NOTL 0.192665 0.349648 0.613097 1     
VIGL 
-0.54192 -0.08587 0.136105 -0.18587 1    
TWQ 
-0.29351 0.002003 0.223032 -0.09843 0.77402 1   
DTR 0.716134 -0.03214 0.349977 0.008807 -0.1865 0.009058 1  
RPR 0.47751 0.729237 0.362548 0.376126 -0.26469 -0.39715 0.292485 1 
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We can see that the strongest correlation with DTR is SKKN with a correlation 
in excess of 0.72. Likewise, the strongest correlation with RPR is TRNG with a 
correlation in excess of 0.73. Even though SKKN does not have a strong correlation with 
RPR, it is moderately correlated with the coefficient value of 0.48.  
 However, surprisingly neither TWQ and DTR, nor TWQ and RPR are correlated 
high. Even TWQ and RPR are negatively correlated. The correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is -0.4, meaning that when TWQ increases by one unit, RPR 
decreases by a 0.4-unit. In other words, high TWQ does not necessarily increase RPR in 
incident response process; on the contrary, high TWQ cause RPR to be decreased. These 
surprising results could be explained by examining correlation between TWQ and 
SKKN, and TWQ and TRNG. Correlation coefficients between SKKN and TWQ, and 
TRNG and TWQ are -0.3 and 0, respectively. These results mean that the higher SKKN, 
the lower TWQ with a rather low (0.3) correlation coefficient; and, there is no 
correlation between TRNG and TWQ.  To summarize, it is probable that a defender who 
is highly skillful and knowledgeable do not want to or need to work in teams. Thus, the 
defender is willing to take control of responding against detected security incidents 
rather than work together with his or her team members due to several possible reasons, 
including that he or she lacks of trust on less skillful and knowledgeable team members. 
However, it does not always guarantee RPR would go higher since SKKN is moderately 
– not highly – correlated (0.48) with RPR. 
 If we examine correlations between DTR and TWQ, SKKN and TWQ, and SKKN 
and DTR, there are some findings: 1) TWQ is not related with DTR, 2) one-unit increase 
in SKKN causes 0.3-unit decrease in TWQ, and 3) SKKN is highly correlated with DTR. 
These findings suggest that a team needs to hire highly skillful and knowledgeable 
defender to increase DTR, irrespective of how well the team works together in intrusion 
detection process. 
 To summarize, when dealing with complex, critical problem such as intrusion 
detection and incident response, interaction with other team members can be a 
distraction. As long as a team has a highly skillful and knowledgeable defender, it would 
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be better the defender take control of detecting intrusions and responding against those 
detected intrusions. However, in case of response, it would be better a highly trained 
defender take control of response rather than a highly skillful and knowledgeable 
defender since RPR is more highly correlated with TRNG than SKKN. One possible 
reason for that is when responding against detected intrusions, more practical experience 
obtained through security training or other related training would be needed more since 
problems defenders would face with are real, practical problems. In other words, a 
practical application of our knowledge and skill onto the problem of response is essential 
to solving the problem incident response teams are facing with. 
 
5.4. Hypothesis Testing 
5.4.1. Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1: Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of security personnel is statistically 
significantly related to Detection Rate (DTR) 
 
Based on the results of the correlation analysis, we set up Hypothesis 1. The linear 
regression model for the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
DTR = β0 + β1*SKKN + random error 
 
The null and alternative hypothesis for testing of the above regression model is as 
follows:  
 
H0: β1 = 0  
Ha: β1 ≠ 0 
 
Table 9 presents data with (weighted) SKKN and DTR, and the data were 
imported into the SAS system for data analysis. Before the regression model fitting and 
analysis, and testing the hypothesis, it can be helpful to see the correlations among the 
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variables, along with p values in the simple regression model. We can get the results 
using proc corr SAS command as shown in Fig. 6.   
 
TABLE 9 
SKKN and DTR Data Imported into the SAS System 
 
 SKKN DTR 
1 3.2 1 
2 3.2 0.067 
3 2.2 0.067 
4 1.6 0.05 
5 2.5 1 
6 2.5 1 
7 1.6 0.05 
8 1.3 0.2 
9 1 0.067 
10 1 0.05 
11 1 0.2 
12 1.6 0.2 
13 3 0.05 
14 1.6 0.1 
15 1.3 0.033 
16 1.3 0.033 
17 6 1 
18 6 1 
19 1.7 0.033 
20 1 0.017 
21 1.6 0.033 
22 1.6 0.033 
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proc corr data="C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SaS Files\overalldata"; 
var DTR SKKN; 
run; 
 
Fig. 6. SAS command PROC CORR and the results 
 
To perform a regression analysis, we should select appropriate independent 
variables for the model of the response variable. If we look to the table above, it displays 
a correlation of 0.71613 between DTR and SKKN, which is significant with a p-value of 
0.0002. That is, there exists a positive linear relationship between these two variables. 
As SKKN increases, DTR increases. Knowing that the variable (SKKN) is strongly 
associated with DTR, we predict that the variable (SKKN) would be a statistically 
significant predictor in the simple regression model. We expect that a better detection 
rate (DTR) performance would be associated with higher level of skill & knowledge 
(SKKN). In the following sections, we examine the output from the regression analysis. 
The CORR Procedure 
2  Variables:    DTR      SKKN 
 
Simple Statistics 
   Variable         N         Mean      Std Dev          Sum       Minimum      Maximum   Label 
   DTR              22      0.28559      0.40029      6.28300      0.01700       1.00000      DTR 
   SKKN           22      2.17273      1.41898     47.80000     1.00000       6.00000     SKKN 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 22 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
               DTR          SKKN 
DTR        1.00000       0.71613 
          DTR                            0.0002 
SKKN      0.71613      1.00000 
                                                 SKKN       0.0002 
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5.4.1.1. Testing 
Hypothesis testing for determining whether the linear model is useful for predicting Y 
(DTR) from X (SKKN), that is, testing usefulness of the model follows. At significance 
level alpha = 0.05, we can test the hypothesis that the Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of 
security personnel contributes useful information for the prediction of the Detection Rate 
(DTR). In other words, we test the predictive ability of the least squares straight-line 
model:  
 
 Y hat = β0 hat + β1 hat * X, where Y = DTR, X = SKKN 
 
Through the SAS Fit analysis, we get the β0 of - 0.1533 and β1 of 0.2020, as shown in 
Fig. 7. 
 
Model  Equat i on
DTR  =  -   0. 1533  +  0. 2020 SKKN
 
Fig. 7. Regression model equation 
 
Thus, we get the predicted model equation: 
 
  E(Y) = - 0.1533 + 0.2020 * X, where Y = DTR, X = SKKN 
 
If we see the graph of the linear regression model using the SAS Fit Analysis, it would 
be best to understand what the regression model looks like. The graph is shown in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. Graph of the linear regression model using the SAS Fit Analysis 
 
Testing the usefulness of the model requires testing the null (H0) and alternative 
(Ha) hypotheses as mentioned above. To test the hypothesis for determining whether the 
linear model (or straight-line model) is useful for predicting Y (DTR) from X (SKKN), a 
test statistic T can be used. With N (total number of SKKN data points) of 22 and 
significance level alpha of 0.05, the critical value based on (N - 2) = (22 - 2) = 20 d.f. is 
as follows:  
 
T alpha/2 = t 0.025 = 2.086 
 
Thus, we will reject H0 if t < - 2. 086 or t > 2. 086. Our test statistic t = β1 hat / (s/√SSxx), 
where β1 hat = SSxy/SSxx, SSxy = ∑xy – (∑x)( ∑y)/n, SSxx = ∑x2 – (∑x)2/n. The 
calculation summary is shown in Table 10. 
 
β1hat = 0.2020, s2 = SSE/ (N – 2) = 1.6392 (from the Table 11) / 20 =  0.08196,  
 s = √0.08196 = 0.2863 
√SSxx = √(∑x2 – (∑x)2/n) = √(146.14 – 2284.84/22) = √42.28  =  6.50 
t = β1 hat / (s/√SSxx) = 0.2020 / (0.2863 / 6.50) = 0.2020 / 0.0440 = 4.591 
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TABLE 10 
Summary of the Calculation of SKKN, x2, DTR, y2, and xy  
 
SKKN (x)  x2  DTR (y) y2 xy 
3.2 10.24 1 1 3.2 
3.2 10.24 0.067 0.004489 0.2144 
2.2 4.84 0.067 0.004489 0.1474 
1.6 2.56 0.05 0.0025 0.08 
2.5 6.25 1 1 2.5 
2.5 6.25 1 1 2.5 
1.6 2.56 0.05 0.0025 0.08 
1.3 1.69 0.2 0.04 0.26 
1 1 0.067 0.004489 0.067 
1 1 0.05 0.0025 0.05 
1 1 0.2 0.04 0.2 
1.6 2.56 0.2 0.04 0.32 
3 9 0.05 0.0025 0.15 
1.6 2.56 0.1 0.01 0.16 
1.3 1.69 0.033 0.001089 0.0429 
1.3 1.69 0.033 0.001089 0.0429 
6 36 1 1 6 
6 36 1 1 6 
1.7 2.89 0.033  0.0561 
1 1 0.017 0.000289 0.017 
1.6 2.56 0.033 0.001089 0.0528 
1.6 2.56 0.033 0.001089 0.0528 
∑x = 47.8 
∑x2  = 146.14 
∑y = 6.283 
∑y2  = 
5.158112 
∑xy = 22.1933 
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TABLE 11 
ANOVA for DTR with SKKN as the Predictor Variable 
Anal ysi s of  Var i ance
Source
Model
Error
C Tot al
DF
     1
    20
    21
Sum of  Squares
    1. 7256
    1. 6392
    3. 3648
Mean Square
    1. 7256
    0. 0820
F St at
   21. 05
Pr > F
  0. 0002
 
 
 
 
Since t = 4.591 > 2. 086, we should reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
the slope β1 is not 0. Thus, at the alpha = 0.05 level of significance, the sample data we 
observed provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) 
of security personnel contributes useful information for the prediction of the Detection 
Rate (DTR) using the linear model. 
Testing how well the least squares line fit the data, that is, testing fitting level of 
the model follows. After testing the usefulness of the linear regression model, we should 
test how well the regression model fits the data we collected. A measure, called the 
coefficient of determination (R2), can answer this question. It can be computed using a 
statistics package such as SAS. R2 is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
(DTR) that can be predicted from the independent variable (SKKN). The measure is 
useful for assessing how many of the errors in the prediction of y (DTR) can be reduced 
by using the information provided by x (SKKN) [76]. R2 is: 
 
R2 = (SSyy – SSE) / SSyy = 1 – SSE/SSyy,  
where SSE is Residual SS and SSyy is Total SS (in Excel-like data analysis) 
 
SSyy = ∑y2 – (∑y)2/n = 5.158 – 39.476/22 = 3.364 
SSxy = ∑xy – (∑x)( ∑y)/n = 22.193 - 47.8*6.283/22 = 8.542 
SSE = ∑ (y – y hat)2 = SSyy – β1 hat * SSxy = 3.364 – 0.2020*8.542= 1.639 
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TABLE 12 
Summary of Fit for DTR with SKKN as the Predictor Variable 
Summary of  Fi t
Mean of  Response     0. 2856
Root  MSE     0. 2863
R-Square   0. 5128
Adj  R-Sq   0. 4885
 
 
 
 
Thus, R2 = 1 – SSE/SSyy = 1 – 1.639/3.364 = 0.513. This is the value (0.5128; 
rounding error in the calculation) we find from Table 12. This value indicates that 51% 
of the variance in DTR can be predicted from the variable SKKN. In other words, 51% 
of the total variation, SSyy (the sum of the squared prediction errors) = ∑ (Actual Y – 
Predicted Y)2 = ∑ (Y – Y_bar)2, is explained by the model, and the remaining portion is 
explained by random error. R2 = 0 and 1 implies a complete lack of fit of the model to 
the data and a perfect fit, respectively. Thus, typically, the larger the value of R2, the 
better the model fits the set of data. 
Sincich [76] warns that, however, we can use the value of R2 as a measure of 
how useful a linear model will be for predicting Y only if the sample contains 
substantially more data points than the number of β parameters in the model. Thus, the 
more data that we can obtain from experiments, the more confident we can be. 
In the ‘Summary of Fit’ section (see  Table 12), we find another important value 
– Adjusted R2. Adjusted R2 attempts to yield a more accurate value to estimate the R2 
value for the population. Adjusted R2 can be computed using the following formula: 
 
 1 - ((1 - R2)((N - 1) / (N - k - 1))),  
where N is the number of observations and k is the number of predictors 
(dependent variables) 
 
From this formula, we can see that when N is small and k is large, greater 
differences between R2 and adjusted R2 may exist since the ratio of ((N - 1) / (N - k - 1)) 
will be less than 1.  Conversely, when N is large compared to k, R2 and the adjusted R2 
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will be much closer since the ratio of (N - 1) / (N - k - 1) will begin to approach 1. The 
summary of fit presents that the value of R2 and adjusted R2 are 0.5128 and 0.4885, 
respectively. The difference between the two values is 0.0243, which can be much closer 
to 0 when we have more data. 
Testing significance of the model and coefficient follows. To see whether it is 
statistically significant with the predicted variable, we should look to the p-value 
(attained significance level) of the F-test. F value is 21.05, and the p value is shown to 
the right hand side of the F-value in the figure, i.e. 0.0002. The p value associated with 
this F value is small (0.0002).  The p value and significance level of 0.05 are compared 
with each other, and the p value is smaller. Since the p-value is smaller, the model is 
statistically significant, and thus we may conclude that the independent variable (SKKN) 
reliably predicts the dependent variable (DTR). The positive coefficient (0.2020, shown 
below) of SKKN and its significance (p=0.0002) indicates that the higher the level of 
Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) that security personnel possess, the better (higher) the 
Detection Rate (DTR). Thus, this SAS analysis result makes sense. 
The significance of the coefficient for SKKN can be assessed using the p-value 
of the T-test. The T-test for SKKN equals 4.59, presented in Table 13. By comparing the 
p value (0.0002) and alpha level (e.g. 0.05) selected, we know that p value is smaller. 
Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for SKKN is 0. In other 
words, the regression coefficient of 0.2020 is significantly different from 0.  Even at a 
lower alpha level (0.01), the coefficient for SKKN would still be significant. 
 
TABLE 13 
Parameter Estimates for DTR with SKKN as the Predictor Variable 
Par amet er  Est i mat es
Var i abl e
I nt er cept
SKKN
DF
     1
     1
Est i mat e
   - 0. 1533
    0. 2020
St d Er r or
    0. 1135
    0. 0440
t  St at
     - 1. 35
      4. 59
Pr  >| t |
  0. 1917
  0. 0002
Tol er ance
     .     
    1. 0000
Var  I nf l at i on
         0
    1. 0000
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5.4.1.2. Verification of Assumptions 
We also have to check the validity of assumptions. First, we check the assumption of 
normal distribution. It is the residuals that need to be normally distributed to establish 
the validity of the t-test; note that the estimation of the regression coefficients does not 
require normally distributed residuals. We can exploit some graphical methods to 
illustrate the data: residual-by-predicted plot and normal quantile-quantile plot. 
A residual-by-predicted plot is commonly used to diagnose nonlinearity or unequal 
variances of error. It is also used to find outliers. A residual-by-predicted plot is 
illustrated by the plot on the left in Fig. 9. It is a plot of residuals versus predicted 
responses for each observation.  
A normal quantile-quantile plot of residuals is illustrated by the plot on the right 
in Fig. 9. The empirical quantiles are plotted against the quantiles of a standard normal 
distribution. If the residuals are normally distributed, the points on the residual normal 
quantile- quantile plot should lie approximately on a straight line with residual mean as 
the intercept and residual standard deviation as the slope. Even if we can see that the 
residuals are not perfectly normally distributed, it is hard to draw a firm conclusion since 
the data points are not that far away from the straight line.  
As another method, we use a normal probability plot, which is often used to 
examine the distribution of variables. The SAS command proc capability with the ppplot 
statement is used for the normal probability plot. The command and its results are shown 
in Fig. 10. It does not seem that the plot of SKKN looks 100% normal. From the various 
plots we examined, we see that the variable (SKKN) does not look quite normal, but is 
still within a somewhat normal range.  
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 Fig. 9. Residual-by-Predicted and Residual Normal QQ Plots 
 
5.4.2. Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: Training (TRNG) and Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of security personnel 
are statistically significantly related to the Response Rate (RPR) 
 
The correlation between RPR and TRNG is high; however, the correlation between RPR 
and SKKN is moderate. We know that, from the result of the SAS command proc corr 
(shown in Appendix 1), the model of RPR with SKKN as the predictor variable is 
significant since the p-value of 0.0451 is less than the significance level of 0.05. Thus, it 
may be possible to build a multiple regression model of RPR with TRNG and SKKN as 
its predictor variables. We expect that a higher Response Rate (RPR) would be 
associated with higher level of both Training (TRNG) and Skill and Knowledge (SKKN).  
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proc capability data="C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SAS Files\overalldata" noprint; 
  ppplot SKKN; 
run; 
 
 
Fig. 10. Normal probability plot with the SAS command PROC CAPABILITY with ppplot 
statement 
 
Based on the correlation analysis results, the multiple linear regression model for 
Hypothesis 2 can be set up as follows: 
 
RPR = β0 + β1*TRNG + β2*SKKN + random error 
 
 Table 14 presents data with (weighted) SKKN and TRNG, and RPR, and the data were 
imported into the SAS system for data analysis. 
 49 
TABLE 14 
Data with (weighted) SKKN and TRNG, and RPR 
 
 SKKN TRNG RPR 
1 3.2 2.7  
2 3.2 2.7 0.067 
3 2.2 2.4 0.067 
4 1.6 2.7 0.018 
5 2.5 2.4 0.2 
6 2.5 2.4 0.2 
7 1.6 3.9 1 
8 1.3 2.4 0.04 
9 1 2.4 0.067 
10 1 2.4 0.04 
11 1 2.4 0.038 
12 1.6 2.4 0.05 
13 3 3 0.1 
14 1.6 3 0.029 
15 1.3 2.4 1 
16 1.3 2.4 0.05 
17 6 3.4 1 
18 6 3.4 1 
19 1.7 3.7 1 
20 1 2.4  
21 1.6 4.4  
22 1.6 3.3  
 
 
 
5.4.2.1.Testing 
Hypothesis testing for determining whether the overall multiple regression model is 
useful for predicting Y(RPR) from X1 (TRNG) and X2 (SKKN), that is, testing 
usefulness of the model follows. The hypotheses for testing whether a general linear 
model can be useful for predicting Y (RPR) is as follows [27]: 
 
 H0: β1 = β2 = 0 
 H1: At least one of the two β parameters in H0 is nonzero. 
 
 50 
With the hypothesis, F statistic is used as a test statistic for model usefulness. 
The numerator degrees of freedom is k, which is the number of parameters in the model 
(excluding β0), and denominator degrees of freedom is n - (k + 1), where n is the number 
of observations. Both values determine the value of F. Since n = 18 data points and k = 2, 
the rejection region for the test is:  
 
F > Fα =3.68, where α = 0.05 
 
The value of F has been computed and presented in Table 15 in the row 
corresponding to the model (in ANOVA section). Since the F value of 9.48 exceeds the 
critical value, F0.05 = 3.68, we may reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least 
one of the two parameters (β1 and β2) is nonzero. In other words, the model appears to be 
useful for predicting Y, RPR.  
Measuring how well the model fits the data follows. To measure how well the 
model fits the data collected, R2 can be computed. R2 is the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable (RPR) that can be predicted from the independent variables (TRNG 
and SKKN). In ‘Summary of Fit’ section (see  Table 15), we see that the R2 is 0.5583, 
meaning that approximately 56% of the variability of RPR is accounted for by the two 
variables – TRNG and SKKN – in the regression model.   
Note that the adjusted R-square is 0.4994, which indicates that approximately 
50% of the variability of RPR is accounted for by the regression model, even after taking 
into account the number of predictor variables in the model. Note that difference 
between the value of R2 and that of adjusted R2 (0.5583 and 0.4994, respectively) is 
0.0589, which can be much closer to 0 when more data is available. 
Testing significance of the overall model follows. To see if the overall model is 
significant, we should look to the p-value (attained significance level) of the F-test.  The 
p-value for the test is also shown to the right hand side of the F-value in the figure, i.e. 
<.0022. This means that if the model did not contribute any information for the Y 
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prediction, the probability of observing the F statistic of 9.48 would be only less than 
0.0022. Because the p-value is very small (0.0022), the model is statistically significant.  
Testing significance of the two predictor variables follows. We focus on whether 
the two predictors are statistically significant with the predicted variable, and if so, the 
direction of the relationship. Training (TRNG) is significant because p = 0.0044 and its 
coefficient is 0.5440. The coefficients for each of the predictor variables indicates the 
amount of change one could expect in RPR with a one-unit change in the value of each 
variable, given that all other variables in the model are held constant. The positive 
coefficient for TRNG indicates that the higher the training level the security personnel 
possess, the better (higher) the response rate. The SAS analysis results support this 
conclusion. 
However, the coefficient for SKKN is not significantly different from 0 with the 
alpha level of 0.05 because its p-value of 0.3578 is greater than 0.05. Thus, the level of 
Skill & Knowledge (SKKN) seems to be unrelated to the Response Rate (RPR). This 
would seem to indicate that that the level of Skill & Knowledge is not an important 
factor in predicting the Response Rate. This result is somewhat unexpected and 
confusing.  
 
5.4.2.2. In-depth Analysis 
We should do several checks to make sure we firmly stand behind these results before 
drawing conclusions. First, because we are interested in residuals, we perform residual 
analysis against predictor variables. The results are displayed in Fig. 11. By examining 
residual plots, we can see one data point – located above y-value of 0.8 – is far from 0. 
Thus, we can suppose that the data point could be an outlier or influential value. To 
examine outliers or influential values, we use different statistics to catch those extreme 
values.  
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TABLE 15 
SAS Fit Analysis for RPR with TRNG and SKKN as Its Predictors 
 
RPR  = TRNG SKKN
Response Di st r i but i on: Normal
Li nk Funct i on: I dent i t y
Model  Equat i on
RPR  =  -   1. 2900  +  0. 5440 TRNG  +  0. 0518 SKKN
Summary of  Fi t
Mean of  Response     0. 3314
Root  MSE     0. 3039
R-Square   0. 5583
Adj  R-Sq   0. 4994
Anal ysi s of  Var i ance
Source
Model
Error
C Tot al
DF
     2
    15
    17
Sum of  Squares
    1. 7513
    1. 3856
    3. 1369
Mean Square
    0. 8756
    0. 0924
F St at
    9. 48
Pr > F
  0. 0022
Paramet er  Est i mat es
Var i abl e
I nt ercept
TRNG
SKKN
DF
     1
     1
     1
Est i mat e
   -1. 2900
    0. 5440
    0. 0518
St d Error
    0. 4146
    0. 1624
    0. 0546
t  St at
     -3. 11
      3. 35
      0. 95
Pr  >| t |
  0. 0071
  0. 0044
  0. 3578
Tol erance
          
    0. 7919
    0. 7919
Var  I nf l at i on
         0
    1. 2627
    1. 2627
Col l i near i t y Di agnost i cs
    
Number
     1
     2
     3
Ei genval ue
    2. 7930
    0. 1933
    0. 0137
Condi t i on I ndex
    1. 0000
    3. 8015
   14. 2572
Var i ance Proport i on
I nt ercept
    0. 0036
    0. 0333
    0. 9630
TRNG
    0. 0031
    0. 0131
    0. 9839
SKKN
    0. 0266
    0. 8415
    0. 1319
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Fig. 11. Residual plots of RPR against each of the predictor variables 
 
It can be helpful to look at the scatter plots of RPR against each of the predictor 
variables so that we may have some ideas about potential problems residing in the 
regression model. We can create a scatter plot matrix of these variables as shown in Fig. 
12. 
In each plot, we see some data points that are far removed from the rest of the 
data points (i.e. possible outliers). Even though the SAS commands above provide us 
with useful information regarding the variables, we need to exploit other statistics to 
identify all the potentially unusual or influential data values. These statistics include  
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studentized residual (named st_r), leverage (named lev), Cook's D (named ckd), and 
DFFITS (named dft).  
 
proc insight data="C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SAS Files\overalldata"; 
  scatter RPR TRNG SKKN* 
          RPR TRNG SKKN; 
run; 
RPR
0. 018
1. 000
TRNG
2. 4
4. 4
SKKN
1. 0
6. 0
 
 
Fig. 12. SAS PROC INSIGHT command with scatter plots of RPR against each of the 
predictor variables 
 
 
RPR 
TRN  
SKKN 
 55 
Before using studentized residual, we can use proc reg, of which the results are 
similar to Table 15 (thus, we will not show the results here). The command is shown in 
Fig. 13. Then, we begin a more in-depth investigation with the four statistics mentioned 
above. 
First, we examine the studentized residuals to identify potentially unusual or 
influential data values such as outliers. We request the studentized residuals in the output 
statement and name them st_r. The command and its (partial) results are shown in Fig. 
13. 
From looking at the extreme observations and a stem-and-leaf display, we find a 
high value of 5.315190; this seems to be excessive. That value is also found in the output 
of all the studentized residuals and leverage against each observation of SKKN, TRNG, 
and RPR.  The commands and its output are shown in Fig. 14. 
Usually, we should be concerned about the observation where the absolute value 
of studentized residuals exceeds 2, and we should be even more concerned about the one 
where the absolute value of the residuals exceeds 3. However, in this case, the 22nd 
observation, with the studentized residual of 5.31519, is in excess of the absolute value 
of 5. We conjecture that even though both SKKN and TRNG have a low number each – 
1.3 and 2.4, respectively – the observation has the highest RPR value.   
Leverage (named lev in our analysis) is the second statistic we employ to check 
all the potential influence on the regression coefficient estimates.  We can get the results 
of leverage using the SAS command proc univariate. The command and its (partial) 
results are displayed in Fig. 15. 
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proc reg data="C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SAS Files\overalldata"; 
  model RPR=TRNG SKKN; 
  output out=overalldata(keep= RPR TRNG SKKN st_r lev cd dffit) 
                       rstudent=st_r h=lev cookd=ckd dffits=dft; 
run; 
proc univariate data=overalldata plots plotsize=20; 
  var st_r; 
run;  
Extreme Observations 
------Lowest------        ------Highest----- 
    Value        Obs          Value      Obs 
-1.416973       14        0.385777        7 
-1.402450       13        0.544461       17 
-0.956025        2         0.544461       18 
-0.821109        4         0.765629       19 
-0.209424        3         5.315190       15 
 
Fig. 13. SAS PROC commands and results of the studentized residuals 
 
 
 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot 
                            5 3                        1                * 
                            4 
                            4 
                            3 
                            3 
                            2 
                            2 
                            1 
                            1 
                            0 558                      3                | 
                            0 224                      3             +--+--+ 
                           -0 2211110                  7             *-----* 
                           -0 8                        1                | 
                           -1 440                      3                0 
                              ----+----+----+----+ 
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proc sort data=overalldata; 
  by st_r; 
run; 
 
proc print data=overalldata(obs=22); 
run; 
Obs      SKKN    TRNG    RPR        lev           st_r 
                         1         3.2          2.7            .       0.09189         . 
                         2         1.0          2.4            .       0.10399         . 
                         3         1.6          4.4            .       0.92333         . 
                         4         1.6          3.3            .       0.18034         . 
                         5         1.6          3.0       0.029    0.09770    -1.41697 
                         6         3.0          3.0       0.100    0.07410    -1.40245 
                         7         3.2          2.7       0.067    0.09189    -0.95603 
                         8         1.6          2.7       0.018    0.06647    -0.82111 
                         9         2.2          2.4       0.067    0.09260    -0.20942 
                        10        1.6          2.4       0.050    0.08667    -0.16170 
                        11        1.3          2.4       0.040    0.09242    -0.14367 
                        12        1.3          2.4       0.050    0.09242    -0.11025 
                        13        1.0          2.4       0.038    0.10399    -0.09904 
                        14        1.0          2.4       0.040    0.10399    -0.09232 
                        15        1.0          2.4       0.067    0.10399    -0.00162 
                        16        2.5          2.4       0.200    0.10428     0.18426 
                        17        2.5          2.4       0.200    0.10428     0.18426 
                        18        1.6          3.9       1.000    0.49990     0.38578 
                        19        6.0          3.4       1.000    0.41718     0.54446 
                        20        6.0          3.4       1.000    0.41718     0.54446 
                        21        1.7          3.7       1.000    0.35851     0.76563 
                        22        1.3          2.4       1.000    0.09242     5.31519 
 
Fig. 14. SAS PROC commands and results of the studentized residuals and leverage 
against each observation 
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proc univariate data=overalldata plots plotsize=20; 
  var lev; 
run; 
                                       Extreme Observations 
                          -------Lowest------        ------Highest----- 
                               Value       Obs            Value       Obs 
                           0.0664715        8         0.358510       21 
                           0.0740961        6         0.417178       19 
                           0.0866705       10         0.417178      20 
                           0.0918910        7         0.499901       18 
                           0.0918910        1         0.923325        3 
Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot 
                            9 2                        1                * 
                            8 
                            7 
                            6 
                            5 0                        1                * 
                            4 22                       2                0 
                            3 6                        1                0 
                            2 
                            1 00000008                 8             +-----+ 
                            0 779999999                9             +--+--+ 
                              ----+----+----+----+ 
                          Multiply Stem.Leaf by 10**-1 
 
Fig. 15. SAS PROC UNIVARIATE command and results of the leverage 
 
Usually, we should carefully examine a single data point with leverage greater 
than (2K + 2) / N, where K is the number of predictor variables and N is the number of 
observations. In our case, K is 2 and N is 22 (missing values are included), working out 
to (2 * 2 + 2) / 22 = 0.272727. To check out the data points with the value greater than 
0.272727, we use the SAS command proc print with the where statement, shown in Fig. 
16, followed by its results. 
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proc print data=overalldata; 
  var RPR TRNG SKKN; 
  where lev > 0.272727; 
run; 
Obs    RPR    TRNG    SKKN 
                                      3          .          4.4         1.6 
                                     18        1          3.9         1.6 
                                     19        1          3.4         6.0 
                                     20        1          3.4         6.0 
                                     21        1          3.7         1.7 
 
Fig. 16. SAS PROC PRINT command and results of the data points with leverage greater 
than (2K + 2) / N 
 
Except for the missing value for RPR, we find four data points greater than 
0.272727. The data point (studentized residual of 5.31519) with TRNG of 2.4 and 
SKKN of 1.3 was highlighted in the studentized residuals tests, but not here in the 
leverage tests. We have four other data points.  
Third, we use Cook's D (named ckd in our analysis) to identify all the potentially 
unusual or influential data values. It measures the information regarding both residuals 
and leverage. Zero is assumed to be the lowest value in Cook’s D. If the value of Cook’s 
D is higher, the data point is assumed to be more influential. Usually, a threshold to 
decide Cook’s D is 4 / N, where N is the number of observations. The command for 
Cook’s D and its result are shown in Fig. 17. We see that the Cook’s D for observation 
#22 is the highest (0.34046). 
The last statistic we use is DFFITS (named dft in our analysis). A conventional 
threshold for DFFITS is 2 * √ (K / N), where K and N are the number of predictor 
variables and the number of observations, respectively. The bigger the absolute value 
corresponding to the data point, the greater the influence of the point might be. The 
observation #22 is also the most influential (1.69617) observation. The command for 
DFFITS and its results are shown in Fig. 18. 
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proc print data=overalldata; 
  where ckd > (4/22); 
  var RPR TRNG SKKN ckd; 
run; 
                               Obs    RPR    TRNG    SKKN      ckd 
                               22        1          2.4          1.3      0.34046 
 
Fig. 17. SAS PROC PRINT command and results of the data points with Cook’s D greater 
than 4 / N 
 
proc print data = overalldata; 
  where abs(dft) > (2 * √ (2/22)); 
  var RPR TRNG SKKN dft; 
run; 
                              Obs    RPR    TRNG    SKKN      dft 
                               22        1          2.4          1.3     1.69617 
 
Fig. 18. SAS PROC PRINT command and results of the data points with absolute DFFITS 
value greater than 2 * √ (K / N) 
 
Through the four statistical checks, we might claim that the data point (RPR=1, 
TRNG=2.4, SKKN=1.3) with studentized residual of 5.31519, Cook’s D of 0.34046, and 
DFFITS of 1.69617 is most influential. However, to be even more certain we can 
consider another statistical check called DFBETAS, which is a scaled measure of the 
change in each parameter estimate. This assesses how each coefficient can be changed 
by deleting the corresponding observation; large values in the DFBETAS output indicate 
influential observations in estimating given parameters. Usually, observations with a 
value bigger than the absolute value of (2 / √ N), where N is the number of observations, 
should cause concern. We can use ods output OutStatistics statement with proc reg  
 
 61 
proc reg data="C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SAS Files\overalldata"; 
  model RPR = TRNG SKKN / influence; 
  ods output OutputStatistics=RPRdfbetas; 
  id RPR TRNG SKKN; 
run; 
                                               Output Statistics 
                                                                    -------------DFBETAS------------- 
                Obs     RPR      TRNG     SKKN     Intercept    TRNG      SKKN 
                 1             .           2.7           3.2             .                .                  . 
                 2       0.067         2.7           3.2        -0.1090      0.1143     -0.1886 
                 3       0.067         2.4           2.2        -0.0495      0.0423     -0.0179 
                 4       0.018         2.7           1.6        -0.0438     -0.0146      0.0846 
                 5        0.2            2.4           2.5         0.0459     -0.0422      0.0263 
                 6        0.2            2.4           2.5         0.0459     -0.0422      0.0263 
                 7          1             3.9           1.6        -0.3040      0.3593     -0.2139 
                 8       0.04           2.4           1.3        -0.0291      0.0179      0.0121 
                 9       0.067         2.4            1         -0.0003      0.0002      0.0002 
                10       0.04          2.4            1         -0.0178      0.0092      0.0131 
                11      0.038         2.4            1         -0.0191      0.0098      0.0140 
                12       0.05          2.4          1.6        -0.0345      0.0242      0.0045 
                13        0.1            3             3           0.0738     -0.0915     -0.1150 
                14      0.029          3           1.6          0.1502     -0.2648      0.2576 
                15          1           2.4          1.3          1.0768     -0.6615     -0.4481 
                16       0.05         2.4          1.3         -0.0223      0.0137      0.0093 
                17          1           3.4            6          -0.1044      0.0219      0.3712 
                18          1           3.4            6          -0.1044      0.0219      0.3712 
                19          1           3.7          1.7         -0.4323      0.5195     -0.3110 
                20          .            2.4            1                .                 .               . 
                21          .            4.4          1.6               .                 .               . 
                22          .            3.3          1.6               .                 .               . 
 
Fig. 19. SAS PROC REG command and results of DFBETAS 
 
command for DFBETAS outputs. The command and its (partial) results are shown in Fig. 
19. 
We see that the values bigger than the absolute value of (2 / √22) are 
observations #15 (-0.6615 for TRNG) and #19 (0.5195 for TRNG). The DFBETAS 
value for TRNG is -0.6615, which means that SKKN increases the coefficient for TRNG 
by 0.6615 standard errors.  
By performing this DFBETAS statistic, we can have stronger confidence that the 
data point (#15 in the DFBETAS output; RPR=1, TRNG=2.4, SKKN=1.3) with 
studentized residual of 5.31519, Cook’s D of 0.34046, and DFFITS of 1.69617 appears 
to be an outlier. Thus, we may eliminate this data point in our analysis. However, 
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without justification (e.g., scientific reasons), we cannot discard this data point 
automatically from our full data. 
 
5.4.2.3. Verification of Assumptions 
We check the validity of assumptions, similarly to the approach performed with the 
simple regression model. First, we test for normality of residuals. For that test, we 
examine a normal quantile graph, displayed in Fig. 20, and QQ plot, displayed in Fig. 21, 
to plot the quantiles of variables against the quantiles of a normal distribution.  
Normal quantile graph seems to indicate that the residual distribution is not 
perfectly normal. The closer the residual points are to the line defining normality, the 
more likely the residuals are normally distributed. However, except for one data point 
located high above the straight line, the distribution of the residuals is somewhat near to 
the line. 
Residual normal quantile-quantile (QQ) plot of residuals is illustrated in Fig. 21. 
The empirical quantiles are plotted against the quantiles of a standard normal 
distribution. It seems to be approximately normal because each residual point is not far 
from the line.  
Second, we check the multicollinearity. Several methods are available to detect 
multicollinearity. One of the simplest methods is to use the correlation data analysis, 
which examines the correlation coefficient r between each pair of independent variables. 
The result is shown in Table 16. 
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Fig. 20. Normal quantile graph 
 
 
 
Fig. 21. Residual normal QQ plot 
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TABLE 16 
Correlation Data Analysis of Two Independent Variables TRNG and SKKN 
Correl at i on Mat r i x
    
TRNG
SKKN
TRNG
  1. 0000
  0. 2898
SKKN
  0. 2898
  1. 0000
 
 
 
 
Anderson [2], in his review of linear regression model, states that there is a rule 
of thumb, in terms of multicollinearity, that if the correlation coefficient between two 
variables is greater than 0.80 then there is a problem. It seems that there is no 
multicollinearity between the two variables since the r value is closer to zero than it is to 
one. However, Miles and Shevlin [53] warn that low correlations do not indicate that 
there is not a problem, because it is the multiple correlations that matter, not the bivariate 
correlations. 
 Another method is to use the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) [53]. 
Tolerance for a variable is calculated as 1 – R2. The variable being assessed is used as 
the dependent variable and other variables are used as independent variables in a 
regression analysis. The tolerance of value ‘zero’ implies that the variable being assessed 
is completely predictable from the other independent variables; in other words, it is a 
perfect multicollinearity. A tolerance of value ‘one’ implies that the variable being 
assessed is completely not predictable from the other independent variables; in other 
words, it is a perfect non-multicollinearity. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF), which is closely related to the tolerance, is 
calculated as 1 / tolerance. It may explain the degree to which the standard error of a 
variable has increased due to multicollinearity. It is suggested that a VIF in excess of 10 
is an indication that multicollinearity may be causing problems in estimation [10], [60], 
and the largest VIF value among all the predictor variables is often used as an indicator 
of the severity of multicollinearity [60].  Table 17 shows the results from the  
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TABLE 17 
Multicollinearity Analysis (VIF) for Two Independent Variables (SKKN and 
TRNG) 
Paramet er  Est i mat es
Var i abl e
I nt ercept
SKKN
TRNG
DF
     1
     1
     1
Est i mat e
   -1. 2900
    0. 0518
    0. 5440
St d Error
    0. 4146
    0. 0546
    0. 1624
t  St at
     -3. 11
      0. 95
      3. 35
Pr >| t |
  0. 0071
  0. 3578
  0. 0044
Tol erance
     .     
    0. 7919
    0. 7919
Var  I nf l at i on
         0
    1. 2627
    1. 2627
  
 
 
 
multicollinearity analysis. There seems to be no violation of the VIF factor within the 
model since the VIF values of the two independent variables are lower than 10. 
The other option regarding multicollinearity exists in an SAS command. The 
collinoint option displays the condition number – a commonly used index of the global 
instability of the regression coefficients. The commands and the results of collinearity 
diagnostics are presented in Fig. 22. 
A condition number – much larger than (approximately) 30 – could be, according 
to many authors, a sign of harmful multicollinearity [69]. Since the numbers in the 
results are much lower than 30, there is no violation of multicollinearity.  
 
5.4.3. Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3: High-SKKN level groups provide better detection (i.e. faster detection 
rate) than Medium-SKKN level groups 
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proc reg data='C:\Program Files\SAS\SAS 9.1\My SAS Files\overalldata'; 
 model RPR = TRNG SKKN / vif tol collinoint; 
run; 
Collinearity Diagnostics (intercept adjusted) 
                                                                                  --Proportion of Variation- 
                 Number     Eigenvalue   Condition Index    TRNG          SKKN 
                      1            1.45613             1.00000         0.27194         0.27194 
                      2            0.54387             1.63625         0.72806         0.72806 
 
Fig. 22. SAS PROC REG command and results of collinearity diagnostics 
 
5.4.3.1.Testing 
Two different groups are compared according to their SKKN level. It is assumed that the 
two groups (i.e., populations) have equal variances, and the populations from which the 
samples are selected have approximately normal distributions. We classify their SKKN 
level into three regions, with rounding off SKKN level: Low (1), Medium (2 – 5), and 
High (6). SKKN level of a team is represented by the person who has the highest SKKN 
level within his/her team. Thus, if one person’s SKKN level is 6 and no one in his team 
has more than 6, his team has the SKKN value of 6. Comparison between the two groups 
is presented in  Table 18, and the data used are displayed in  Table 19. 
 
TABLE 18 
Comparison between Two Groups with Different SKKN Level 
 
 Group 1 (High-SKKN) Group 2 (Medium-SKKN) 
Groups Echo04 Alpha, Bravo, Echo03 
Characteristics One superstar exists No superstar exists                    
Medium-level personnel prevails 
SKKN level 6 2 – 5 
Security experience & 
knowledge (0.7) 
> 24 mo. > 0.5 mo.  –  ≤ 24 mo. 
System experience (0.3) > 60 mo. > 6 mo.  –  ≤ 60 mo. 
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TABLE 19 
Detection Rate of Each Group with Different SKKN Level 
 
Group 
name  SKKN  
Detection 
rate 
1 
0.067 
0.067 
Alpha 
0.05 
1 
1 Bravo 
0.05 
0.2 
0.05 
0.1 
Echo03 
medium 
0.033 
1 
1 Echo04 high 
0.033 
 
 
 
To test the hypothesis that High-SKKN level groups provide better detection (i.e. 
faster detection rate) than Medium-SKKN level groups, we perform a hypothesis test 
about the difference between two population mean in a small sample case. The null and 
alternative hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0: µ1= µ2 (i.e. no difference in detection rate) 
H1: µ1≠ µ2 (i.e. there is difference),  
where µ1: true mean DTR for High-SKKN level groups, µ2: true mean DTR for 
Medium-SKKN level groups 
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TABLE 20 
Comparison Results of DTR for Two Groups with Different SKKN Level 
 
  
DTR of Group 1 (high-
SKKN) 
DTR of Group 2 (medium-
SKKN) 
Mean 0.677666667 0.328818182 
Variance 0.311696333 0.187823164 
Observations 3 11 
Pooled Variance 0.208468692  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 12  
t Stat 1.173030684  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.13177126  
t Critical one-tail 1.782286745  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.26354252  
t Critical two-tail 2.178812792  
 
 
 
Using the EXCEL t-test (two sample assuming equal variances), we get the 
comparison results, shown in Table 20. The test statistic t is 1.173030684, which is the t-
value calculated from the data. Note that the calculated t-value of 1.173030684 does not 
exceed the critical t-value (two-tailed) of 2.178812792. Thus, using a two-tailed test at a 
5% level of significance (i.e. α = 0.05), we fail to reject the null hypothesis. In other 
words, on the basis of the given data, we cannot support the claim that High-SKKN level 
groups provide better detection (i.e. faster detection rate) than Medium-SKKN level 
groups.  
One possible reason for this result is that the variance of each group is rather 
high:  Medium-SKKN level groups of 0.187823164, and High-SKKN level groups of 
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0.311696333. A second possible reason is that potential outliers are not removed from 
the data. Third possible reason is that the security attack detection was not that difficult, 
considering the attack comes from the CS department class students – and most of them 
are novices for this type of experiment. 
 
5.4.4. Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4: High-TRNG level groups provide better response (i.e. faster response 
rate) than Medium-TRNG level groups  
 
5.4.4.1.Testing 
Two different groups are compared according to their TRNG level. It is assumed that the 
two groups (i.e., populations) have equal variances, and the populations from which the 
samples are selected have approximately normal distributions. We classify their TRNG 
level into three regions, with rounding off TRNG level: Low (1), Medium (2 – 3), and 
High (4 – 6). The reason why these regions have different scale from the SKKN case (in 
hypothesis 3) is that we need to differentiate the TRNG level of each group so that we 
can form two different TRNG groups (i.e., High and Medium). TRNG level of a team is 
represented by the person who has the highest TRNG level within his/her team. 
Comparison between the two groups is presented in  Table 21, and the data used are 
displayed in  Table 22. 
  
TABLE 21 
Comparison between Two Groups with Different TRNG Level 
 
 Group 1 (High-TRNG) Group 2 (Medium-TRNG) 
Groups Bravo, Echo04 Alpha, Echo03 
Characteristics One (comparably) highly-trained 
personnel exists 
No (comparably) highly-trained 
personnel exists 
Medium-level personnel prevails 
TRNG level 4 –  6 2 –  3 
Security training (0.7) > 4 mo. > 0.5 mo.  –  ≤ 4 mo. 
Other training (0.3) > 12 mo. > 1 mo.  –  ≤ 12 mo. 
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TABLE 22 
Response Rate of Each Group with Different TRNG Level 
 
Group 
name TRNG  
Response 
rate 
0.067 
0.067 Alpha 
0.018 
0.05 
0.1 
0.029 
Echo03 
medium 
1 
0.2 
0.2 Bravo 
1 
1 
1 Echo04 
high 
1 
 
 
 
To test the hypothesis that High-TRNG level groups provide better response (i.e. 
faster response rate) than Medium-TRNG level groups, we perform a hypothesis test 
about the difference between two population mean in a small sample case. The null and 
alternative hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0: µ1= µ2 (i.e. no difference in response rate) 
H1: µ1≠ µ2 (i.e. there is difference), 
where µ1: true mean RPR for High-TRNG level groups, µ2: true mean RPR for 
Medium-TRNG level groups 
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TABLE 23 
Comparison Results of RPR for Two Groups with Different TRNG Level 
 
  
RPR of Group 1 (high-
TRNG) 
RPR of Group 2 (medium-
TRNG) 
Mean 0.733333333 0.190142857 
Variance 0.170666667 0.128260476 
Observations 6 7 
Pooled Variance 0.147536017  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 11  
t Stat 2.54188611  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.013693935  
t Critical one-tail 1.795883691  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.027387871  
t Critical two-tail 2.200986273  
 
 
 
Using the EXCEL t-test (two sample assuming equal variances), we get the 
comparison results, shown in Table 23. The test statistic t is 2.54188611, which is the t-
value calculated from the data. Note that the calculated t-value exceeds the critical t-
value (two-tailed) of 2.200986273. The means for RPR of the two groups are 
significantly different at p = 0.027387871. Thus, using a two-tailed test at a 5% level of 
significance (i.e. α = 0.05), we reject the null hypothesis. In other words, on the basis of 
the given data, we support the claim that High-TRNG level groups provide better 
responses (i.e. faster response rate) than Medium-TRNG level groups.  
Thus, it is necessary to hire and allocate to the incident response team highly 
trained security personnel when addressing the security response process. In other words, 
the efficiency of the incident response team comprised of at least one security personnel 
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with a high level of TRNG – greater than 4 – will be better than the team which has only 
medium-TRNG-level personnel.  
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6. SUMMARY 
To have increased security through better technology, a large number of researchers and 
practitioners have studied the issue in terms of attack patterns, attack incident handling 
policies, training for security managers and analysts, building available patches, 
hardening OS, and so forth. It is a well-known fact that systems are usually vulnerable to 
attack by remote users or insiders; however, the human groups are another source of 
vulnerabilities due to a variety of reasons, including human misbehavior. Within the 
organization’s budget, the resources such as human-resources must be allocated properly 
in order to effectively react to emergency situations (e.g. security attacks). Thus, it will 
be worthwhile to investigate the problem by measuring the effects of key human factors 
on the intrusion detection and incident response process. In other words, it is a matter of 
measuring security team performance in terms of efficiency in the process of intrusion 
detection and incident response.  
 The research questions set up, as shown in Section 1.3, supports the importance of 
the problem. They are presented here again: 
 
1. Where can human vulnerabilities occur? 
2. What approaches can be effective in handling them? Why? 
3. What are the goals of using these approaches? 
 
To answer these questions in the hope of providing an appropriate solution to the 
problem statement, we proposed an interactive model – consisting not only of a machine 
model but also a man model – called the Man-Machine Model (M3), which can entail 
human factors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first innovative effort to 
incorporate group behavior dynamics into Man-Machine Model (M3) for the 
improvement of security defense processes in terms of human vulnerabilities. The model 
enables us to assess not only potential bottlenecks from machines, but also human 
vulnerabilities such as misbehavior or lack of knowledge/skill. By proposing the model, 
 74 
we considered potentially important factors that might impact the security team 
efficiency.  Through correlation analysis we obtained some factors (variables) which 
have strong relationships with the performance variables. 
Some hypotheses seem to be plausible after investigating the correlation analysis, 
but we had to drop some hypotheses, discussed in Section 6.2, due to weak relationships. 
The efforts were to set up important research hypotheses that would enable us to derive 
quantitative models, which might explain the efficiency of the security defense team. We 
created regression models through hypothesis testing, and we tested the models in a way 
that allows us to interpret the hypothesis testing results.  
 Using the analysis and hypothesis testing results, we provide the answers to the 
following research questions. The first question is “Where can human vulnerabilities 
occur from?” The answer to this question comes from many sources including literatures 
and modeling. As we see from the case of the Slammer worm [14], the human 
vulnerabilities can occur whenever security personnel lack knowledge/experience or 
misbehave. These problem sources can occur in any defense process, which includes 
intrusion detection and incident response processes. To test this claim, we conducted 
hypothesis testing and found out those who have lower TRNG levels perform poorer 
than those who have higher TRNG levels, according to the hypothesis testing results of 
Hypothesis 4. We can infer that if security personnel have sufficient training experience 
to perform their role in a security defense process, they will seldom perform misconduct 
or make the information systems vulnerable or risky. In other words, they will be far 
from having human vulnerabilities. 
 A systematic approach to the second question of “What approaches can be 
effective to handle them? Why?” is to construct a model entailing a portion that can 
make the measurement of human vulnerabilities possible. To measure human stupidity 
as an indication of human vulnerabilities, for instance, we may have SKKN (Skill and 
Knowledge) or TRNG (Training). Likewise, to measure human carelessness, we may 
have VIGL (Vigilance) or TWQ (Teamwork Quality). This is the motivation of 
proposing the interactive model – M3, which not only contains machine-related factors 
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but man-related factors such as SKKN and VIGL. Thus, we claim that our modeling 
approach can be an effective way to handle human vulnerabilities since the model M3 
incorporates security personnel behavior as well as system/tool configuration or 
functioning.  
 The answer to the third question of “What are the goals of using these 
approaches?” is to derive quantitative performance models of a security defense process 
(intrusion detection and incident response), where the models can analyze the efficiency 
of the security defense team. If the models are applied to an optimization problem, they 
should be able to help in human resource allocation problems, which will be discussed in 
Section 6.3. 
 
6.1. Key Contributions 
The key contributions of dissertation research can be summarized as follows. First of all, 
we developed a realistic, holistic security attack-defense model – Man Machine Model 
(M3) – to deal with human vulnerabilities in security defense process. The model is 
realistic in that the model can measure human vulnerabilities, seldom investigated in 
information assurance fields. The model is holistic in that not only system (machine) 
components but human (man) components are developed.   
Second, we obtained and evaluated several regression models to predict the 
efficiency of security defense teams whose key human factors can influence the 
efficiency. For instance, we can use the models to predict detection rates when the level 
of security personnel’ Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) is low (e.g. 1.6 out of 6). We can 
also predict response rate when the level of security personnel’ Training (TRNG) is high 
(e.g. 4.4 out of 6). We can likewise predict the increase or decrease of the efficiency of 
security defense team while varying the values of key variables such as SKKN and 
TRNG. Thus, when it concerns investments to increase the level of skill and knowledge 
of security personnel, organizations can either hire personnel with an appropriate level of 
skill and knowledge or they can make efforts to increase the level of skill and knowledge 
of security personnel they are presently working with.  
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 Third, the man model in M3 can be used as a reference model to other domains. 
The model can be applicable or adaptable to other fields, as it is not necessarily confined 
to the information assurance fields. The model can be used in fields whose processes 
involve group behavior, allowing determinations about what group behaviors impact the 
processes being modeled and how best to improve those processes. 
 
6.2. Discussion 
6.2.1.  Hypothesis 2 with Adjustment  
After excluding the outlier we found during the examination of Hypothesis 2, we 
obtained data file through several regression analyses and diagnostics, as shown in  
Table 24. We repeated the SAS fit analysis since we already had another data file that 
did not include the outlier. The analysis results are shown in  Table 25. With these data, 
we repeat the hypothesis testing that was performed in Section 5.4.2.1; however, we do 
this testing succinctly this time since we previously presented the testing process in 
depth. 
Hypothesis testing for determining whether the overall multiple regression model 
is useful for predicting Y(RPR) from X1 (TRNG) and X2 (SKKN), that is, testing 
usefulness of the model follows. Since n = 17 and k = 2, the denominator degrees of 
freedom is 14. The rejection region for the test is  
 
F > Fα =3.74, where α = 0.05. 
 
Since the F value of 33.61 (shown in Table 25 in the row corresponding to Model 
(in ANOVA section)), exceeds the critical value, F0.05 = 3.74, we may reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the two parameters (β1 and β2) is nonzero. In 
other words, the model appears to be useful for predicting Y, RPR.  
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TABLE 24 
SKKN, TRNG, and RPR Data without the Outliers 
 
21
13
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
I nt
SKKN
3. 2
3. 2
2. 2
1. 6
2. 5
2. 5
1. 6
1. 3
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
1. 6
3. 0
1. 6
1. 3
6. 0
6. 0
1. 7
1. 0
1. 6
1. 6
I nt
TRNG
2. 7
2. 7
2. 4
2. 7
2. 4
2. 4
3. 9
2. 4
2. 4
2. 4
2. 4
2. 4
3. 0
3. 0
2. 4
3. 4
3. 4
3. 7
2. 4
4. 4
3. 3
I nt
UDST
3
3
4
2
5
5
3
4
3
3
4
1
2
3
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
I nt
NOTL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
I nt
VI GL
3. 7
3. 6
4. 2
4. 5
4. 8
5. 0
 .  
 .  
4. 8
4. 5
4. 5
4. 3
4. 2
4. 1
4. 2
3. 7
3. 7
3. 9
3. 9
5. 0
5. 0
I nt
TWQ
4. 67
4. 70
4. 91
5. 34
5. 74
5. 92
 .   
 .   
5. 54
5. 20
5. 13
4. 89
5. 31
4. 25
4. 67
4. 63
4. 61
4. 43
5. 22
5. 90
5. 90
I nt
RPR
 .    
0. 067
0. 067
0. 018
0. 200
0. 200
1. 000
0. 040
0. 067
0. 040
0. 038
0. 050
0. 100
0. 029
0. 050
1. 000
1. 000
1. 000
 .    
 .    
 .    
I nt
R_RPR
  .     
-0. 1638
 0. 0449
-0. 2128
 0. 1779
 0. 1779
-0. 0653
 0. 0179
 0. 0449
 0. 0179
 0. 0159
 0. 0279
-0. 3394
-0. 4104
 0. 0279
 0. 2824
 0. 2824
 0. 0738
  .     
  .     
  .     
 
 
 
 
Measuring how well the Model fits the data follows. R2 (shown in the Summary 
of Fit section in Table 25) is 0.8276, meaning that approximately 83% of the variability 
of RPR is accounted for by the two variables – TRNG and SKKN – in the regression 
model. Note that the adjusted R-square is 0.8030, which indicates that approximately 
80% of the variability of RPR is accounted for by the regression model, even after taking 
into account the number of predictor variables in the model. The difference between the 
value of R2 and that of the adjusted R2 is 0.0246, which is closer than the previous results 
containing the outliers. 
Testing significance of the overall model follows. The p-value for the test is 
shown to the right hand side of the F-value in Table 25, i.e. <.0001. This means that if 
the model did not contribute any information for the Y prediction, the probability of 
observing F statistic of 33.61 would be only less than 0.0001. Since the p-value is very 
small (less than 0.0001), the model is statistically significant.  
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TABLE 25 
SAS Fit Analysis for RPR with TRNG and SKKN as Its Predictors (Outliers 
Excluded) 
 
RPR  = TRNG SKKN
Response Di st r i but i on: Normal
Li nk Funct i on: I dent i t y
Model  Equat i on
RPR  =  -   1. 5560  +  0. 6081 TRNG  +  0. 0664 SKKN
Summary of  Fi t
Mean of  Response     0. 2921
Root  MSE     0. 1811
R-Square   0. 8276
Adj  R-Sq   0. 8030
Anal ysi s of  Var i ance
Source
Model
Error
C Tot al
DF
     2
    14
    16
Sum of  Squares
    2. 2045
    0. 4591
    2. 6636
Mean Square
    1. 1023
    0. 0328
F St at
   33. 61
Pr > F
  <. 0001
Type I I I  Test s
Source
TRNG
SKKN
DF
     1
     1
Sum of  Squares
    1. 2745
    0. 1356
Mean Square
    1. 2745
    0. 1356
F St at
     38. 86
      4. 13
Pr > F
  <. 0001
  0. 0614
Paramet er  Est i mat es
Var i abl e
I nt ercept
TRNG
SKKN
DF
     1
     1
     1
Est i mat e
   -1. 5560
    0. 6081
    0. 0664
St d Error
    0. 2521
    0. 0975
    0. 0327
t  St at
     -6. 17
      6. 23
      2. 03
Pr >| t |
  <. 0001
  <. 0001
  0. 0614
Tol erance
     .     
    0. 8058
    0. 8058
Var I nf l at i on
         0
    1. 2410
    1. 2410
Col l i near i t y Di agnost i cs
    
Number
     1
     2
     3
Ei genval ue
    2. 7944
    0. 1915
    0. 0141
Condi t i on I ndex
    1. 0000
    3. 8200
   14. 0956
Var i ance Propor t i on
I nt ercept
    0. 0037
    0. 0338
    0. 9625
TRNG
    0. 0031
    0. 0138
    0. 9830
SKKN
    0. 0267
    0. 8549
    0. 1184
 
 
 
 
Testing significance of the two predictor variables follows. Training (TRNG) is 
significant because p is less than 0.0001, and its coefficient is 0.6081. The positive 
coefficient for TRNG indicates that the higher the training level the security personnel 
possess, the better (higher) the response rate. Thus, this SAS analysis results make sense. 
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On the other hand, the coefficient for SKKN is not significantly different from 0 with the 
alpha level of 0.05 because its p-value of 0.0614 is greater than 0.05.   
However, it is very close to 0.05. Thus, with the alpha level of 0.05, SKKN 
seems to be unrelated to the response rate (RPR); however, we cannot state this with 
confidence. With more data collected in the future, this hypothesis could be tested again 
to check the significance of SKKN since it may be possible that SKKN has a small p-
value of 0.05. With the alpha level of 0.1, however, SKKN seems to be related to the 
Response Rate (RPR). Besides, the positive coefficient (0.0664) for SKKN indicates that 
the higher the skill and knowledge that security personnel possess, the better (higher) the 
response rate.  
Since it can be useful to compare the hypothesis testing results before and after 
getting away with the outliers, we present the comparison results in  Table 26. As you 
see in the table, there is improvement when we exclude the outliers; actually, just one 
data point – a single outlier. The R-square value increased by 0.27, and the adjusted R-
square by 0.30. The p-value of the F-test and p-values of the t-test for TRNG and SKKN 
also increased considerably. Throughout the comparison the adjustment, or exclusion of 
the outliers, seems to affect the testing. 
 
TABLE 26 
Comparison of Important Statistics – before and after the Outliers 
 
 Before (with outliers) After (without outliers) 
R-square (Rs) 0.5583 0.8276 
Adjusted R-square (Ra) 0.4994 0.8030 
Difference between Rs and Ra 0.0589 0.0246 
p-value of F-test 0.0022 < 0.0001 
p-value of T-test (TRNG) 0.0044 < 0.0001 
p-value of T-test (SKKN) 0.3578 0.0614 
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6.2.2. Other Hypotheses 
6.2.2.1. Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5: Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) of security personnel and Teamwork Quality 
(TWQ) are statistically significantly as related to Detection Rate (DTR) 
 
Hypothesis 5 is that the two key factors, Skill and Knowledge (SKKN) and Teamwork 
Quality (TWQ), and a performance (i.e., efficiency) factor of Detection Rate (DTR) are 
dependent. In other words, SKKN and TWQ are linearly (or nonlinearly) related to DTR. 
This hypothesis is derived from (1) the experience of two network/system administrators 
at Computer Science Department at Texas A&M University, and (2) human 
vulnerabilities [8]. The two network/system administrators claim that both trust and skill 
sets are two important factors in security-related attack detection and response. J. E. 
Canavan [8] defines human vulnerability as human stupidity, carelessness, laziness, 
greed, and anger. He stresses that human vulnerability can be considered the greatest 
threats to networks and systems, and can (or will) do more damage than other threats 
combined, i.e. system, physical, media, etc. Moreover, he mentions that human 
vulnerabilities and the risks associated with them are the most difficult to defend against. 
To measure trust, we should have TWQ, which contains two items – mutual support and 
cohesion – that may help measure the degree of trust among team members. Likewise, to 
measure skill sets, we should have SKKN that covers both skill sets and knowledge. 
Lack of knowledge or skills can be measured from SKKN.  Human carelessness and 
laziness can be measured from TWQ because TWQ contains an item of effort, which can 
measure how careless or lazy the security personnel are. 
This hypothesis is very important since the degree of effect of the key factors on 
security personnel’s performance, i.e. detection rate, may influence both the amount of 
investment on overall security process and re-coordination of current security 
environment settings in organizations. Furthermore, it may change the mindsets of those 
who deal with security-related tasks because they usually focus on algorithmic or 
technical factors to deal with security attacks, not human-related ones.  
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6.2.2.2. Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6: Training (TRNG) of security personnel is statistically significantly related 
to the Detection Rate (DTR) 
 
Hypothesis 6, also as important as Hypothesis 5, is that a key factor Training (TRNG) 
and Detection Rate (DTR) are dependent. This hypothesis is derived from conclusions 
reached by other authors encountered in the literature. For example, ISO/IEC 17799 [5], 
[6] claim that providing appropriate training and education is often critical to the 
successful implementation of information security within an organization. Also, A NIST 
Handbook [58] states that a sound awareness and training program can help an 
organization reduce the number and severity of errors and omissions, which are an 
important threat to data and system integrity. 
This hypothesis is important because the degree of effect of training on security 
personnel’s performance, i.e. detection rate, may affect organizations’ spending on 
training programs in hopes of improving the level of security defense in both detection 
and response. Organization may conserve resources if they know how much money they 
should spend on their training programs for better security defense. 
 
6.2.3. Reliability Analysis 
To measure reliability of measuring instruments, I perform reliability analysis. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, a well-known method, is used to check the reliability. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient examines if the relationship between true values and 
observed values is strong. Using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, reliability results with 
three variables that have more than two measuring instruments – Skill & Knowledge 
(SKKN), Training (TRNG), and Teamwork Quality (TWQ) – are presented in  Table 27. 
Both SKKN and TRNG have two measurements; TWQ have five measurements. The 
analysis was performed with SPSS, well-known statistical software.  
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TABLE 27 
Reliability of Measures 
 
Measure Reliability 
SKKN 0.635 
TRNG 0.273 
TWQ 0.903 
 
 
 
 Based on a rule of thumb [24], reliability of SKKN is questionable because it is 
less than 0.7; reliability of TRNG may not be acceptable because it is less than 0.5; 
reliability of TWQ is excellent because it is greater than 0.9. The necessity to increasing 
the reliability of TRNG is addressed in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3. Lessons Learned 
One of the lessons learned through our research experiments is that unexpected things 
happen. Initially, we thought TWQ – one of the key variables in the group behavior 
model (man model) – would be a strong predictor variable in evaluating the efficiency of 
the security defense team. However, correlation analysis revealed that TWQ was not 
related to the predicted variables such as DTR (Detection Rate) and RPR (Response 
Rate). The reasons for this remain unclear, though it is possible to speculate. 
First, it might be possible that the defenders were not eager to successfully fill 
out the seven-page Teamwork Quality (TWQ) form during the security experiments; not 
only was the form the lengthiest out of the five, they had to spend some time in thinking 
about their mental states, communication, efforts, etc. Second, it may be possible that the 
defenders filled out the TWQ form using the same rationale as the previous forms. Third, 
it might be possible that there were not enough potential attacks or that the defenders 
were already prepared to detect and react through hardening their OS and installing 
several good intrusion detection tools; if there were not many attacks, it is possible that 
the teamwork quality of the defense groups were rather good, meaning that there were 
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not many ups and downs in their working conditions. Alternately, if the defenders were 
well prepared, it might be possible that they were confident to begin with and through 
successful intrusion detection their confidence grew over time. 
 Additionally, we initially hoped to obtain considerable amounts of data from the 
defenders and attackers. However, we failed to obtain much data because only several 
defenders willingly filled out the data forms according to our instructions. The failure 
resulted in a bottleneck of more accurate prediction and estimation. Thus, we realized 
that it was difficult to have human subjects willingly participate in this data collection 
since they had their own jobs to perform for their class. To obtain more data, we will 
have to have our own experiment environments in which the systems for experiments are 
prepared appropriately and the human subjects recruited more willingly participate. 
 
6.4. Future Work 
It is our hope that future studies use our study results as a framework for extending these 
research hypotheses. To extend research hypotheses, further investigation of other 
uncovered but possibly influential factors will be needed. These factors can be applied to 
set up hypotheses for verifying the level of statistical relevance in the process of 
intrusion detection and incident response. At the same time, other processes such as 
preparation could be focused on as well. In that case, preparedness might be an 
important factor (variable) in predicting the efficiency of the security preparation process. 
To be more specific, preparedness – as a complex variable such as TWQ – can play an 
important role in combining several variables.  
 The quality of either the intrusion detection or incident response process is another 
area for future studies to measure and predict the effectiveness of security defense 
processes.  While current research focuses more on efficiency, future studies can take 
effectiveness as another performance issue in security defense process. With efficiency 
only, no one knows how good the detection or response was; one only knows how fast 
the defenders’ detection and response was. To address this oversight, it is worthwhile to 
measure the quality of security processes or security defense teams.  
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 Our proposed model, M3, and the regression models obtained through hypothesis 
testing can be applied by organizations towards making the most appropriate allocations 
in human resources with regard to improving security defense processes. We do not 
specifically cover the issue of optimization in this dissertation, but it is a problem of 
interest. The results of human resource allocations can influence security defense teams 
by increasing confidence, combating skill degradation, and maintaining long-term 
effectiveness; therefore the allocation issue will play an important role in the hiring or 
firing of security personnel in an organization. Through human resource allocation, an 
organization can arrange the tasks undertaken by specific personnel in various situations 
(such as security emergencies); this would impact hiring strategies by giving 
organizations the ability to hot-swap security team members on a per-occasion basis in 
order to improve effectiveness. Additionally, when hiring decisions are not immediately 
confident, the efficiency and effectiveness of the security defense team can be measured 
to investigate potential bottlenecks that might keep the team from increasing its 
performance. 
 Simulation is another important issue to be studied further. The simulation of M3 
was under the development of the intrusion detection and incident response processes 
using EXTEND [37], but it is almost ready to be used for further study such as 
sensitivity analysis. Through sensitivity analysis, one can identify the impact of key 
predictor variables (e.g. training) on the predicted variable (e.g. response rate) by 
increasing or decreasing the coefficient values of key predictor variables. Simulation 
also can be used for tradeoff analysis when comparing different levels of security teams 
– for instance, one group with one ‘superstar’ and other personnel who lack equal Skill 
and Knowledge, and another with two personnel with moderate levels of Skill and 
Knowledge and other personnel who lack similarly rated Skill and Knowledge. The 
simulation results can therefore help to understand tradeoffs between the two groups. 
 Finally, reliability problem addresses the issue of whether this instrument will 
produce the same results each time it is administered to the same person in the same 
setting [24]. High reliability may not guarantee good scientific or engineering results, 
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but without reliability good results cannot exist. Reliability, while not sufficient 
condition of the value of research results and their interpretation, is important and 
necessary [46]. Therefore, it is necessary that we should examine further and find 
appropriate methods to increase the reliability of measuring instrument of TRNG high 
since the variable did not have strong reliability. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL FOR SECURITY ATTACKS AND DEFENSE 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to have students work on a security attack and defense 
task using different types of attacks and defense mechanisms in order to assess 
vulnerability in systems and human factors. If you notice anything unusual during the 
conduct of this experiment period, please record your observations in the ‘Comments’ 
section of the ‘Data Collection Form’. 
 
Pre-Experiment:  
 
How to use the computer: 
 
1. Turn on the computer and login in Experiment Room 1. (You should use VPN 
service provided by CIS Network Group at Texas A&M University if you can’t 
login directly.) 
2. Check to make sure your computer has ‘F-Secure SSH Client’ and ‘F-Secure 
SSH File Transfer’ service. (You’re supposed to have these services. If you 
don’t have these services, please ask the Experiment Coordinator to install them 
for your work.) 
3. Check to make sure you computer has ‘Internet Explorer’. (If you don’t have 
one, install one using ‘Connection Wizard’ on your desktop.) 
 
Script for Experiment Coordinator 
 
Read: 
Hi. My name is ___(Coordinator’s name here)_____ and I will be your 
experiment coordinator today. [If the group is not an intact group: “Please take a 
moment to introduce yourself to the group.”] Thanks for coming today. 
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I appreciate your volunteering for this research. I am sure you will find this 
research an interesting and valuable experience for your career. The most 
important thing is that you take it seriously, and do your best to work to deal with 
every problem you may confront during the experiment. This experiment will 
take about seven hours. 
 
Before we get started, I will pass out a consent form and a brief pre-experimental 
questionnaire. When you complete to fill out these forms, please wait quietly 
until everyone is finished. Please do not touch the computer to work until I give 
you instructions to do so. Would anyone like to have a copy of the consent form 
for your records? 
 
Do: 
1. Hand out the consent form and pre-experimental questionnaire. 
2. On the data form, record students’ names, their associated workstation number, 
coordinators’ names, dates, start time, group number.  
3. Collect the consent form and pre-experimental questionnaire. Be sure to offer the 
students a signed copy of their consent forms (if they want one, use the extras 
with the researcher’s signature already on it and have them sign a second one.) 
Make sure the consent form is signed and that the pre-experimental questionnaire 
(background questionnaire) is filled out completely.  
 
 
Read: 
Your group work today will consist of a set of attack task and a coordinated 
defense task for attackers and defenders, respectively. You will need to work as a 
group, which means that you need to discuss and work together for better 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
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Training Guide for Attacks and Defenses will be passed out by the Experiment 
Coordinator to attackers and defenders, respectively. You may refer to the 
Training Guide to attack the computer system and defend the computer system. 
However, you also may use your knowledge in performing the task. In that case, 
you have to record about what you’ve done to attack the computer system or 
defend. You have to specify your activity on the ‘Data Collection Form’, which 
will be provided by the Experiment Coordinator soon. 
 
Do: 
4. Follow the instructions on the Training Guide for Attacks and Defenses for 
your task. 
 
Read: 
Now that you have received Training Guide for Attacks and Defenses, you are 
just about ready to begin your group work on the task. The task you’ll be 
working on today is a group decision-making task. For each event occurred, you 
as a group member (defender) have to discuss and work together with your group 
member(s) to decide which action you’ll take immediately or which procedure 
you’ll follow to deal with the event. For each event you’ll initiate to attack the 
computer system of the defenders, you as a group member (attacker) have to 
discuss and work together with your group member(s) to decide which computer 
system is the target and which attack methods you’ll choose. 
 
Now we’ll discuss the form you’ll be working on today. This form is to ask you 
to provide a set of security attack and defense activity information so that the 
researchers can better understand how each attacker and defender group works.  
Please answer each item as completely as possible.  
 
Do: 
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5. Hand out the Data Collection Form to both attacker and defender groups. Make 
sure they understand that they are performing security attacks and defenses and 
filling out the form based on their activity during the experiment. 
 
Read: 
After a lunch break, you will go to your room where you were this morning to 
work as a group. You will have two hours to complete this task. I will let you 
know when twenty minutes are left. It is up to your group to decide how to 
allocate the time to your task and how to best make use the Training Guide and 
computer resources. 
 
Do: 
6. Tell the participants you will come by and collect the Data Collection Form in 10 
to 15 minutes.  
7. When completed the experiment, collect the form and make sure that all forms 
(including consent form, pre-experimental questionnaire, and Data Collection 
Form) have been filled out completely and correctly with the date and group 
number on ALL materials. If there are any missing items, have the participants 
fill them in. Have every participants return to Experiment Room 1. 
 
Read: 
To debrief you a little bit about what we hoped to gain from this study, our main 
purpose in this experiment was to study potential vulnerability in systems and 
human factors in attack-defense process, and what are most critical factors to 
efficiently and effectively respond to security attacks. If you are interested in 
further details about this study, we can provide you additional information once 
the entire study is completed. 
 
Post-Experiment:  
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8. Be sure to have the participants make comments on the ‘Comments’ section of 
the Data Collection Form if they have some. Tell them to write down their 
comments before they forget. 
9. Make sure every form is collected with the comments. If they have some 
questions, answer the questions. 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENTAL RULE FOR THE ATTACKERS AND DEFENDERS 
 
1.  General  Rules for the Attackers and Defenders 
• You will be required to work one to two hours per day. 
• You will be required to turn in the form you filled out during the experiment as 
soon as you finish so that the Coordinator knows the current experiment progress 
and take necessary actions if needed. 
• You are not allowed to perform any action other than taking necessary steps to 
launch the attacks. For example, you should not modify any files you don’t have 
permission on or delete any system files. 
• If you are not sure the rules and have questions on the form, you should consult 
the coordinator. 
• We suggest that you use the same computer during the whole experiment for the 
purpose of consistency. 
 
2. The Rules for the Attackers 
The attackers will be allowed to use three different types/levels of security attacks 
including ping of death (P), TCP SYN flooding attack (S), and Code Red (C). Each 
attack method represents software vulnerability attack [4], a protocol attack [4], and 
automated (autonomous) propagation attack using a blind targeting model [7], 
respectively. They will be provided necessary information such as tools by the 
coordinator since we assume that the attackers for the experiment represent the real 
attackers. The rules for the attackers are described as follows: 
You are allowed to take necessary steps to launch security attacks against the 
designated system only. Any attack against other systems may cause a violation against 
the rules of the university's Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
• You are not allowed to talk with any defender about your activity in the 
experiment since it may impair the integrity of the experimental result. 
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• You must fill out the form provided by the Coordinator once per day. 
 
3. The Rules for the Defenders 
The defenders belong to a set of groups with two students of a group. Each group has to 
work independently to take necessary actions to defend or mitigate the security attacks 
caused by the attackers. Each group will be provided necessary information such as tools 
by the coordinator because we assume that each group represents an Incidence Response 
Team of an organization. However, if they need further information to defend or 
mitigate, the information gathering is their responsibility. The rules for the defenders are 
described as follows: 
• You can co-work anytime with your team member to operate effectively and 
correctly. You can be allowed to use books, documents, literature, information 
gathered from the Internet, and others.  
• You are not allowed to work with other team members except your team member 
since it may impair the integrity of the experimental result. 
• You must fill out the Data Collection Form once per day.  
• You are not allowed to attack the attackers’ system even though you can do so 
since we assume that the defenders take necessary actions only to 
defend/mitigate the security attacks.  
• You are not allowed to ask the attackers any questions since it may impair the 
integrity of the experimental result. 
 
4. Joint CS / INFO Security Exercise: Spring 2003 Semester 
GOAL: Compromise the B2B/B2C Web Servers for team Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, 
and Echo located in the 10.10.50.X subnet. These web servers were setup and configured 
as a part of the INFO 689 Business Information Security course. No points will be 
awarded for attacking other systems in the 10.10.50.x network, i.e., the DNS server 
located at 10.10.50.2. 
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INITIAL CONDITIONS: Each team will have an account on a system 
“client.info689.org” (10.10.50.3) located in the 10.10.50.x subnet. 
 
OBJECTIVES: 
1) Steal a secret stored in /root/secret. This secret is unique to each team, so there 
are five possible secrets to steal. 
2) Steal the credit card number authorization file. This credit card authorization file 
is unique to each team, so there are five possible credit card files to steal. 
3) Steal the database containing the business inventory. This database is unique to 
each team, so there are five possible databases to steal. 
 
RULES: 
• No physical access to the Business Information Security Laboratory is allowed. 
• No denial of service attacks will be permitted. 
• All attacks MUST be conducted through the CS to INFO VPN tunnel into the 
10.10.50.X network. 
• ONLY SYSTEMS in the 10.10.50.x subnet are to be attacked. Attacking other 
sandboxed systems in the 10.10.x.x network will result in disqualification from 
the exercise as well as loss of all points. 
• The period of engagement will begin 5:00PM CST on Friday, April 11, 2003 and 
end at 5:00PM CST Friday, April 17, 2003. 
 
REWARD: 
Bonus points may be awarded to teams that are successful in compromising server(s). In 
order to receive credit, a detailed description of the attack including tools used, date and 
time, and the objective information must be included. 
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APPENDIX C 
DEFINITIONS 
 
• Attack – 1) [1] An action conducted by an adversary, the attacker, on a    
potential victim  
2) [23] action(s) that prevent any part of an Automated Information 
System (AIS) from functioning in accordance with its intended 
purpose. This includes any action which causes the unauthorized 
destruction, modification, or delay of service; the act of aggressively 
trying to bypass security controls on an Automated Information 
System (AIS). The fact that an attack is made does not necessarily 
mean that it will succeed. The degree of success depends on the 
vulnerability of the system or activity and the effectiveness of existing 
countermeasures. 
• Attacker [1] – an adversary who conducts an attack on a victim (e.g., host) 
• Incident ([35] and [1]) – one or more related attacks that can be 
distinguished from other attacks because of the distinctiveness of attacker, 
type of attack, objectives, sites, or timing 
• Information assurance [1] - The subfield of information science that 
focuses on the conditions necessary to assure users of information systems 
and services that they can expect:  
1. the information and services they use actually did originate with whom 
they claim and are exactly as the originator intended  
2. the information and services they use will be available when needed  
3. the information and services for which they are responsible will be made 
available only to those they intend and only in the manner that they intend  
• Intrusion [1] - Actual illegal or undesired logical entry into an information 
system; The act of violating the security policy or legal protections that 
pertain to an information system 
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• Intrusion detection [82] – The process of preventing and detecting security 
breaches by monitoring user and application activity 
• Intrusion detection system (IDS) [1] - A combination of hardware and 
software that monitors and collects system and network information and 
analyzes it to determine if an attack or an intrusion has occurred. Some ID 
systems can automatically respond to an intrusion 
• Monitoring [1] - Observing a data stream for specified events to provide data 
for subsequent action or analysis 
• Response [1] - Actions taken to protect and restore the normal operating 
condition of computers and the information stored in them when an attack or 
intrusion occurs 
• Security [1] - The subfield of information science concerned with ensuring 
that information systems are imbued with the condition of being secure, as 
well as the means of establishing, testing, auditing, and otherwise 
maintaining that condition 
[21] (mentioned in [19]) measures and controls that ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability of the 
information processed and stored by a computer  
• System  –  1) [1] one or more interconnected physical machines (hosts) 
operating in cooperation with one another to meet a particular mission. 
Systems are generally, although not necessarily, contained within one site. 
Hosts may participate in multiple systems. Systems may be wholly contained 
within one host or distributed across multiple hosts  
2) [3] a group of objects that are joined together in some regular 
interaction  or interdependence toward the accomplishment of some 
purpose 
• Victim [1] - That which is the target of an attack. An entity may be a victim 
of either a successful or unsuccessful attack 
• Vulnerability  
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 1) [1] - A feature or a combination of features of a system that 
allows an adversary to place the system in a state that is both 
contrary to the desires of the people responsible for the system 
and increases the risk (probability or consequence) of 
undesirable behavior in or of the system. A feature or a 
combination of features of a system that prevents the 
successful implementation of a particular security policy for 
that system. A program with a buffer that can be overflowed 
with data supplied by the invoker will usually be considered a 
vulnerability. A telephone procedure that provides private 
information about the caller without prior authentication will 
usually be considered to have a vulnerability  
 2) [8] - A vulnerability is an inherent weakness in the design, 
configuration, or implementation of a network or system that 
renders it susceptible to a threat. Most vulnerabilities can 
usually be traced back to one of three sources: 
• poor design 
• poor implementation 
• poor management 
While there are only threes sources of vulnerabilities, they can 
manifest themselves in many ways. 
• Physical vulnerabilities 
• Hardware and Software vulnerabilities 
• Media vulnerabilities 
• Transmission and Emanation vulnerabilities 
• Human vulnerabilities 
 3) [40], [61] (mentioned in [32]) - Vulnerability is weakness in the 
design, operation, or operational environment of an IT system or 
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product that can be exploited to violate the intended behavior of 
the system relative to safety, security, and/or integrity. 
• Team ([81] and [73]) – a distinguishable set of one or more individuals who 
interact, dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and 
valued mission/goal/objective, who have each been assigned a specific set of 
roles or duties – related to security (for this dissertation) - to perform, and 
who have a limited life-span of membership 
• Teamwork quality* [33] – a comprehensive concept and measure of the 
quality of interactions, i.e., collaborations, in teams; consist of six facets: 
communication, coordination, cohesion, effort, mutual support, and balance 
of member contributions 
• Skill [52] – special ability to do something well, especially as gained by 
learning and practice 
• Knowledge [52] – the facts, information, skills, and understanding that one 
has gained, especially through learning or experience 
• Experience [52] – (the gaining of) knowledge or skill which comes from 
practice in an activity or doing something for a long time, rather than from 
books 
• Training [88] – strive to produce relevant and needed security skills and 
competencies 
• Objective information load – the amount of cues (actions, events, etc., that 
provides a signal for something to be done or standard that can be copied 
[52]) and messages to be processed 
• Perceived mental workload – the degree to which the team is under 
physical, mental, and temporal demand. It also includes frustration level, 
performance satisfaction level, and mental and physical effort level. 
• Verification – 1) [68] - the process of evaluating a software system or 
component to determine if the products of a given development phase satisfy 
the conditions imposed at the start of that phase.  
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2) [43] - a step to determine whether the model implements the 
assumptions correctly. It is related to the correctness of the 
implementation of the assumptions. It is also called debugging, 
that is, ensuring that the model does what it is intended to do. 
• Model [3] –  a representation of a system for the purpose of studying the 
system 
• Simulation model [3] - a particular type of mathematical model of a system 
• Mathematical model [3] -  a model that uses symbolic notation and 
mathematical equations to represent a system 
• Event [43]  - a change in the system state 
• Factors [48] - the input parameters and structural assumptions composing a 
model, in experimental-design terminology   
• Preventive Security [44] -  system’s ability to protect itself from external 
attacks 
• Security Attack [79] - any action that compromises the security of 
information owned by an organization; Four general categories of attack 
would be the followings: 1) Interruption, 2) Interception, 3) Modification, 4) 
Fabrication 
• Authorization [80] (mentioned in [19]) - The granting or denying of access 
rights to a user, program, or process 
• Integrity [57] (mentioned in [32]) Prevention of unauthorized modification 
of information 
• Threat – 1) [8] A threat is anything that can disrupt the operation, 
functioning, integrity, or availability of a network or system. The different 
categories of threats are the followings: 
• natural threats – occurrences such as floods, earthquakes, and storms 
• unintentional threats – the result of accidents and stupidity 
• intentional threats – the result of malicious indent 
         Each type of threat can be deadly to a network. 
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2) [61] (mentioned in [32]) - Threat is potential danger that a 
vulnerability may be exploited intentionally, triggered accidentally, or 
otherwise exercised. 
3) [40] (mentioned in [32]) - Threat is a potential cause of an unwanted 
incident which may result in harm to a system or organization. 
4)  [59] (mentioned in [32]) - Threat is any circumstance or event with the 
potential to harm an IT system through unauthorized access, destruction, 
disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service. 
5) [23] A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to harm to 
a system in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, 
and/or denial of service. Common usage today is from the press, which 
uses the word to describe people who “break into” computers for various 
purposes. 
• Human Vulnerabilities [8] - Human stupidity, carelessness, laziness, greed, and 
anger represent the greatest threats to networks and systems and will do more 
damage than the rest of the others combined. Moreover, human vulnerabilities 
and the risks associated with them are the most difficult to defend against. It is 
important to keep in mind that every network or system designed, configured or 
implemented has vulnerabilities. There is no such thing as a totally secure 
network or system. It does not exist! 
• Countermeasures  -  
 1) [8] - the techniques or methods used to defend against attacks 
and to close or compensate for vulnerabilities in networks or 
systems  
 2) [23] any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure 
that reduces the vulnerability of an ADP system or activity to the 
realization of a threat 
• Information Security (INFOSEC) –  
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 1) [79], [75] - Information Security is about how to prevent 
cheating or, failing that, to detect cheating in information-based 
systems wherein the information itself has no meaningful physical 
existence.  
 2) [8] - Information security = confidentiality + integrity + 
availability + authentication 
• Information Assurance (IA) –  
 1) (U.S. DoD Directive 5-3600.1 in 1996, mentioned in [31]) - 
Information operations that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, and nonrepudiation; including providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities.  
 2) [31] - an engineering discipline that provides a comprehensive 
and systematic approach to ensuring that individual automated 
systems and dynamic combinations of automated systems interact 
and provide their specified functionality, no more and no less, 
safely, reliably, and securely in the intended operational 
environment(s).  
 3) [39] - The protection of systems and information in storage, 
processing, or transit from unauthorized access or modification; 
denial of service to unauthorized users; or the provision of service 
to authorized users. It also includes those measures necessary to 
detect, document, and counter such threats. This regulation 
designates IA as the security discipline that encompasses 
COMSEC, INFOSEC, and control of compromising emanations 
(TEMPEST).  
 4) [86] Information security deals with several different "trust" 
aspects of information. Another common term is information 
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assurance. Information security is not confined to computer 
systems, nor to information in an electronic or machine-readable 
form. It applies to all aspects of safeguarding or protecting 
information or data, in whatever form.  
• Assurance [17] (mentioned in [32]) - Grounds for confidence that an entity 
meets its security objectives 
• Security Assurance [41] (mentioned in [32]) - Grounds for confidence that an 
entity meets its security objectives 
• Security Objective [41] (mentioned in [32]) - Statement of intent to counter 
identified threats and/or safety identified organization policies and assumptions 
• Information Systems (IS) –  
 1) [83] - Information Systems can be classified into three types:  
• Servers/mainframes: usually the most physically secure 
class of systems 
• Workstations: usually located in more open or accessible 
areas of a facility 
• Portable devices: can be an organization’s security 
nightmare  
 2) [50] Information System (a.k.a: Automated Information System, 
Information Technology System) - Any equipment or 
interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in 
the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission 
or reception of data and includes computer software, firmware, 
and hardware 
• Safeguard [40] (mentioned in [32]) - Practice, procedure, or mechanism that 
reduces risk 
• Hypothesis [76] - A statistical hypothesis is a statement about the value of a 
population parameter  
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• Null Hypothesis [76] - The hypothesis against which we hope to gather evidence 
is called the null hypothesis, and is denoted by H0 
• Alternative Hypothesis [76] - The hypothesis for which we wish to gather 
supporting evidence is called the alternative hypothesis, and is denoted by Ha 
• Significance Level [76] - The probability, α, of making a Type I error is called 
level of significance (or significance level) for a hypothesis test.  
• Outlier [77]  - An unusual observation that lies outside the range of the data 
values we want to describe  
• Multicollinearity [77] - When the independent variables in a multiple regression 
analysis exhibit a high degree of correlation, multicollinearity exist.  
• Correlation [53] - a measure of the extent to which two variables are linearly 
related  
• Tolerance [53] - the tolerance of an independent variable is the extent to which 
that independent variable cannot be predicted by the other independent variables  
• Linear regression model [10] - Regression model that all parameters enter the 
equation linearly, possibly after transformation of data  
• Simple linear regression model [10] - Regression model that only one predictor 
(independent) variable exist 
• Multiple linear regression model [10] - Regression model that two or more 
predictor (independent) variables exist  
 
Teamwork Quality* [33] 
There was frequent communication within the team. 
The team members communicated often in spontaneous 
meetings, phone conversations, etc. 
The team members communicated mostly directly and 
personally with each other. 
Communication 
There were mediators through whom much communication 
was conducted. R 
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Project-relevant information was shared openly by all team 
members. 
Important information was kept away from other team 
members in certain situations. R 
In our team there were conflicts regarding the openness of the 
information flow. R 
The team members were happy with the timeliness in which 
they received information from other team members. 
The team members were happy with the precision of the 
information received from other team members. 
 
The team members were happy with the usefulness of the 
information received from other team members. 
The work done on subtasks within the project was closely 
harmonized.  
There were clear and fully comprehended goals for subtasks 
within our team. 
The goals for subtasks were accepted by all team members. 
Coordination 
There were conflicting interests in our team regarding 
subtasks/subgoals. R 
The team recognized the specific potentials (strengths and 
weaknesses) of individual team members.  
The team members were contributing to the achievement of 
the team’s goals in accordance with their specific potential. 
Balance of member 
contributions 
Imbalance of member contributions caused conflicts in our 
team. R 
The team members helped and supported each other as best 
they could. 
If conflicts came up, they were easily and quickly resolved. 
Mutual support 
Discussions and controversies were conducted constructively. 
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Suggestions and contributions of team members were 
respected. 
Suggestions and contributions of team members were 
discussed and further developed. 
 
Our team was able to reach consensus regarding important 
issues. 
Every team member fully pushed the project. 
Every team member gave the project the highest priority. 
Our team put much effort into the project. 
Effort 
There were conflicts regarding the effort that team members 
put into the project. R 
It was important to the members of our team to be part of this 
project. 
The team did not see anything special in this project. R 
The team members were strongly attached to this project. 
The project was important to our team. 
All members were fully integrated in our team. 
There were many personal conflicts in our team. R 
There was personal attraction between the members of our 
team. 
Our team was sticking together. 
The members of our team felt proud to be part of the team. 
Cohesion 
Every team member felt responsible for maintaining and 
protecting the team. 
R
 = reverse coded item 
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APPENDIX D 
DATA FORMS 
 
1. Background Form 
 
Project Pre-Questionnaire Form 
                                                                   
This questionnaire will ask you to provide some information so that we can better understand 
how much knowledge or capability you have as a background.  Please answer each item as 
completely as possible.  You will fill out this questionnaire only once.    
 
Date: ____/___/___     Code Number: 
___________________________ 
 
Team Name: ___________________________  Role: 
___________________________ 
 
Briefly describe your project (experiment): 
 
Development (Working) Schedule: When is the starting date and ending date of your 
work?  
a. Starting Date:  ___ /___ /___      
b. Ending Date: ___/___/___ 
 
1.   Computer Languages: In the blanks below indicate the languages you are familiar 
with and your level of experience with them. When indicating your level of experience, 
please indicate the length of time in months that you have actively worked with the 
language. 
 
 
 
Language 
 
Level of experience, where 1 = novice (≤ 2 
months); 
2 = some experience (≤ 6 months); 3 = 
moderate experience (≤ 1 year); 4 = a good 
deal of experience (≤ 3 years); 5 = 
extensive experience (≥ 3 years) 
 
 
Months 
Ada(83/95)   
Smalltalk   
Modula-2   
Modula-3   
Assembly   
Basic   
COBOL   
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Fortran (77/95)   
Lisp   
Pascal   
Prolog   
C   
C++   
Visual C++   
Visual Basic   
VBScript   
C#   
CGI   
Perl   
Unix shell 
(c/korn/borne/tc/e
tc.) 
  
Java   
JavaScript   
Java Servlet   
Python   
Tcl/Tk   
UML   
HTML   
XML   
ASP   
JSP   
PHP   
(Others)   
(Others)   
(Others)   
(Others)   
(Others)    
 
2. Applications:  In the blanks below indicate the applications you are familiar with and 
your level of experience with them. For the purposes of this questionnaire, we will 
define application (or application program) as a program designed to perform a 
specific function directly for the user or, in some cases, for another application 
program.  Examples of applications include database programs, web browsers, 
development tools, and communication programs. Applications use the services of 
the computer’s OS and other supporting applications.  When indicating your level of 
experience, please indicate the length of time in months that you have actively 
worked with the application. 
 
 Level of experience, where 1 = novice (≤ 2  
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Application 
 
months); 
2 = some experience (≤ 6 months); 3 = 
moderate experience (≤ 1 year); 4 = a good 
deal of experience (≤ 3 years); 5 = 
extensive experience (≥ 3 years) 
 
Months 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
3. Systems: In the blanks below indicate the systems you have worked with and your 
level of experience with them.  For the purposes of this study we will define system 
as comprised of hardware components that have been carefully chosen so that they 
work together and an OS that manage and provide services to other programs that 
can be run in the computer.  Examples of systems are UNIX, LINUX, Microsoft 
Windows (95/98/2000/XP and NT4.0), Sun Solaris 7.0/8.0, etc, as an OS and server 
or router as a hardware component. When indicating your level of experience, please 
indicate the length of time in months that you have actively worked with the system 
 
 
 
System 
 
Level of experience, where 1 = novice (≤ 2 
months); 
2 = some experience (≤ 6 months); 3 = 
moderate experience (≤ 1 year); 4 = a good 
deal of experience (≤ 3 years); 5 = 
extensive experience (≥ 3 years) 
 
 
Months 
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4. Training: In the blanks below please indicate the training you have had and when 
you got it.  Include training obtained both off-line (through class, seminars, 
conferences, telephone) and online (teleconference, e-mail exchange, internet). 
Please mark in the ‘Security’ field if the training you had is related to the security 
area.  
 
 
Training 
 
Security 
(S) 
Duration 
(From mo/day/yr To mo/day/yr) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
5.   Other Security Experience & Knowledge: Please describe any other experience or 
knowledge you have related to the security area. If you have experience in specific tools, 
please indicate them. You may include experience or knowledge obtained from self-
study. 
 
Category Name How many days? 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
6.   Experience working on teams: How much experience have you had working in 
teams? 
 
___ I have seldom (≤ 2 months) worked in teams in the past  
___ I have done some (≤ 6 months) work in teams in the past  
___ I have done a good deal of (≤ 1 year) work in teams in the past   
___ I have worked in teams a lot (≤ 3 years) in the past  
___ I have extensive (≥ 3 years) experience working in teams 
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7.   Previous work with your team: Have you had previous experience with one of your 
team members? Please indicate who they are and describe the nature of the work. 
 
Name: 1. ________________________________ 
             2. ________________________________ 
              3. ________________________________ 
 
Nature of the work: 
___________________________________________________________ 
       
___________________________________________________________ 
   
___________________________________________________________ 
 
8.    To what degree do you understand your project? (Choose one) 
 
___ I have little understanding of my project [Vaguely understand project goal and 
importance; don’t have a ‘big picture’; don’t know what methods 
(algorithms/languages/applications/systems) may be used] 
 
___ I have a basic understanding of my project  [Somewhat understand project goal and 
importance; have a partial ‘big picture’; know roughly what methods 
(algorithms/languages/applications/systems] may be used) 
 
___ I have a good understanding of my project [Roughly understand project goal and 
importance; roughly have a ‘big picture’; know what methods 
(algorithms/languages/applications/systems) may be used] 
 
___ I have considerable understanding of my project  [Understand project goal and 
importance; have a clear ‘big picture’; know what methods 
(algorithms/languages/applications/systems) may be used and how they are going to be 
used for the project; know the constraints and assumptions a little] 
 
___ I have thorough understanding of my project [Very clearly understand project goal 
and importance; have a very clear ‘big picture’; exactly know what methods 
(algorithms/languages/applications/systems) may be used and how they are going to be 
used for the project; know what are the constraints and assumptions] 
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2. Preparation Form 
 
Preparation Form 
 
Please record any activity that you took to prepare for the exercise or to prepare defenses 
against attacks. 
 
1. Team Name: 
 
2. Code Number:     
 
3. Date: 
 
4. Time from:    (am/pm)     Time to:    (am/pm) 
 
5. Activity: 
 
 
6. Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Important Points: 
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8. Please indicate the sources of information you received during this activity and 
the type (e.g., email) of activity it pertained to. If you received more than one 
message of the same type, please indicate the number of messages you received.  
 
Examples of sources might be “/etc/inetd.conf”, “snort log”, and so forth. For the 
type, please type in ‘E’ for email, ‘P’ for phone calls, ‘H’ for hearing from team 
members (off-line), ‘D’ for discussion (off-line), ‘B’ for  Electronic Bulletin 
Board (ex. Yahoo Messenger), ‘O’ for other type (in case of ‘O’, please indicate 
the type).  
 
Sources Type Number of messages 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
3. Activity Record Form 
 
Activity Record Form 
 
For each activity you undertake during the exercise, please fill out a record form.  
Activities include cases where you have detected or discovered a problem or event, 
worked toward a solution for a problem or event, or any other type of action you took 
during the exercise that was not one of the previous two types. 
 
1. Team Name: 
 
2. Code Number:     
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3. Date: 
 
4. Time from:    (am/pm)     Time to:    (am/pm) 
 
5. Problem/Event Detection 
 
a. At what specific time did you find the problem? 
 
b. What was the nature of the problem? Please describe in detail. 
 
 
 
 
c. How did you find the problem? 
 
 
d. Is the problem suspicious of any type of hacking (security attack)? 
(Yes/No/Don’t know) 
 
e. If yes to ‘b’, please tell us the type and name of hacking (security attack) 
if you know: 
i. Type: _________________________________________ 
ii. Name: _________________________________________ 
 
f. If no to ‘b’, why do you think so? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Problem/Event Solving 
 
a. What actions did you take? 
 
 
 
b. When and at what time did you take the actions? 
i. Date: ____/_____/____ 
ii. Time: _____:______ (am/pm) 
 
c. Why did you take the actions? 
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7. Other activity: Please describe any other activity that was not mentioned in 
‘problem/event detection’ or ‘problem/event solving’ that was significant during 
this period. 
 
 
8. Please indicate the sources of information you received during this activity and 
the type (e.g., email) of activity it pertained to. If you received more than one 
message of the same type, please indicate the number of messages you received. 
Please also indicate which phase you were in. 
 
Examples of sources might be “/etc/inetd.conf”, “snort log”, and so forth. For the 
type, please type in ‘E’ for email, ‘P’ for phone calls, ‘H’ for hearing from team 
members (off-line), ‘D’ for discussion (off-line), ‘B’ for  Electronic Bulletin 
Board (ex. Yahoo Messenger), ‘O’ for other type (in case of ‘O’, please indicate 
the type). For the phase, please type in ‘P’ for the prevention phase, ‘D’ for 
detection, ‘R’ or response. 
 
Sources Type Number of 
messages 
Phase 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
9. Downtime 
 
Please indicate the downtime you had during the experiment. Please fill in the 
time duration ([hh:mm] - [hh:mm]) that the downtime occurred, and the reasons 
(Why?). 
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4. Project Teamwork Form 
 
Project Teamwork Form* 
 
This questionnaire will ask you to provide some information so that we can better understand 
how the incidence response teams work.  Please answer each item as completely as possible.  
You will fill out the questionnaire several times as requested throughout the exercise. 
 
Date: ____/___/___     Code Number: 
___________________________ 
 
Team Name: ___________________________  Role: 
___________________________ 
 
 
Start Time [hh:mm]:  _________________       End Time [hh:mm]:  
_________________   
 
  
 
1.  How surprised were you by the attacks you have received since you last filled out this 
questionnaire? 
Not surprised at all: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: 
Extremely surprised 
 
 
2.  Please indicate your beliefs about the following statements that could be applied to 
your team for the period since you last filled out this questionnaire. 
 
N
o. 
Server System 
(Compu
ter) 
Serv
ice 
Netwo
rk 
Applic
ation 
Others Why? 
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 To no 
extent 
To a 
limited 
extent 
To 
some 
extent 
To a 
consid
erable 
extent 
To a 
great 
extent 
This group has confidence in 
itself 
     
This group believes it can 
become unusually good at 
producing high-quality work. 
     
This group expects to be known 
as a high-performing team. 
     
This group believes it can solve 
any problem it encounters. 
     
This group believes it can be 
very productive. 
     
This group can get a lot done 
when it works hard. 
     
No task is too tough for this 
group. 
     
This group expects to have a lot 
of influence around here. 
     
 
 
3.  Please place a check in the box of the response (“Yes”, “No”, or “?”) that indicates 
whether each of the following words or phrases describes your feeling about your work 
during the last work period (since you last filled out these scales.) 
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4. The following questions ask you to describe how your work group works together as 
it makes decisions or solves problems. Please indicate your degree of agreement with 
each of the following statements as they apply to your team since the last time you filled 
out this questionnaire. 
 Yes  No ? (Don’t 
know) 
Demanding 
   
Pressured 
   
Hectic 
   
Calm 
   
Relaxed 
   
Many things stressful 
   
Pushed 
   
Irritating 
   
Under control 
   
Nerve-wracking 
   
Hassled 
   
Comfortable 
   
More stressful than I’d 
like 
   
Smooth running 
   
Overwhelming 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat  
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
This group weighs all the 
potential effects of all 
possible options or 
solutions carefully. 
      
This group carefully 
considers possible negative 
consequences of options or 
solutions. 
      
This group does not 
capitalize on the wisdom 
and experience of all 
members when making 
decisions or solving 
problems. 
      
This group thoroughly 
diagnoses the problems it 
faces. 
      
In group decisions, key 
issues are neglected or not 
fully considered.  
      
This group carefully 
considers questions and 
issues when they run 
counter to the general 
consensus. 
      
This group conducts a 
broad search for 
information about the 
problem or decision. 
      
After making a decision, 
this group often stops to 
reexamine it one more time 
to make sure it is making 
the right choice. 
      
This group makes careful 
plans for implementing its 
decisions or problem 
solutions. 
      
If new, relevant 
information comes up, this 
group considers it 
carefully, even it already 
has closure on the decision, 
problem, or solution. 
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5. Please indicate your degree of agreement with these statements about communication 
within your team since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Somewh
at  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agre
e 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
There was frequent 
communication within 
the team. 
      
There was intensive 
communication within 
our team 
      
Important information 
was kept away from 
other team members in 
certain situations.   
      
The team members 
were happy with the 
timeliness in which they 
received information 
from other team 
members. 
      
The team members 
were happy with the 
accuracy of the 
information received 
from other team 
members. 
      
The team members 
were happy with the 
usefulness of the 
information received 
from other team 
members. 
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6. Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements about 
how your team worked since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 
 
 
7. Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements about 
your team since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Somewh
at  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agree Strong
ly 
Agree 
The work done on sub-
tasks within the project 
was closely 
harmonized. 
      
There were clear and 
fully comprehended 
goals for sub-tasks 
within our team. 
      
Our team avoided 
duplication of effort 
      
There were conflicting 
interests in our team 
regarding sub-tasks/sub-
goals.  
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 Strongly 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Somewh
at  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agre
e 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
It was important to the 
members of our team 
to be part of this 
project. 
      
The team did not see 
anything special in this 
project.  
      
The team members 
were strongly attached 
to this project. 
      
The project was 
important to our team. 
      
All members were 
fully integrated in our 
team. 
      
There were many 
personal conflicts in 
our team.  
      
There was personal 
attraction between the 
members of our team. 
      
Our team was sticking 
together. 
      
All team members 
were equally engaged 
to achieve common 
goals 
      
All members were 
fully contributing to 
our team 
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8. Please indicate your degree of agreement with the following statements about your 
team's work since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 
 
9. Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements about 
your team since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Somewha
t  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agre
e 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
Every team member 
fully pushed the 
project. 
      
Every team member 
gave the project the 
highest priority. 
      
Every team member 
felt fully responsible 
for team goals 
      
There were conflicts 
regarding the effort 
that team members put 
into the project.  
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10. Please indicate your degree of agreement with each of the following statements 
about your team since the last time you filled out this questionnaire. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Somewh
at  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agre
e 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
There was a 
cooperative work 
atmosphere in our 
team 
      
Discussions and 
controversies were 
conducted 
constructively. 
      
Suggestions and 
contributions of team 
members were 
respected. 
      
Suggestions and 
contributions of team 
members were 
discussed and further 
developed. 
      
Our team was able to 
reach consensus 
regarding important 
issues. 
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11. Place a mark on each scale that represents the magnitude of each factor during the 
last work period (since you last filled out these scales). 
 
Mental demand: How many mental and perceptual activities were required (e.g., 
thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the 
work easy or demanding, simple or complex, exacting or forgiving? 
 
Low: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: High 
 
Physical demand: How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, 
turning, controlling, activating, etc.)? Was the work easy or demanding, slow or 
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? 
 
Low: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: High 
 
Temporal demand: How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at 
which the tasks or task elements occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid 
and frantic? 
 
Low: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: High 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Somewh
at  
Disagree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agre
e 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
Our team recognized 
the specific potentials 
(strengths and 
weaknesses) of 
individual team 
members. 
      
Every team member 
was contributing to the 
achievement of the 
team’s goals in 
accordance to their 
specific potentials. 
      
Imbalance of member 
contributions caused 
conflicts in our team. 
      
 134 
Performance: How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of 
the task set by the experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your 
performance in accomplishing these goals? 
Poor: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: Excellent 
 
Effort: How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your 
level of performance? 
Low: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: High 
 
Frustration level: How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed versus 
secure, gratified, content, relaxed, and complacent did you feel during the work? 
 
Low: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: ___: High 
 
*: 2004: #10 was omitted. 
 
 
5. Post-Defense (Analysis) Form 
 
Post-Defense (Analysis) Form 
 
Please indicate anything you learned through this exercise including final thoughts after 
defenses against attacks. 
 
1. Team Name: 
 
2. Code Number:     
 
3. Date: 
 
4. Time from:    (am/pm)     Time to:    (am/pm) 
 
 
5. Final Thoughts & Lessons Learned: 
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6. Please indicate the sources of information you received during this activity and 
the type (e.g., email) of activity it pertained to. If you received more than one 
message of the same type, please indicate the number of messages you received.  
 
Examples of sources might be “/etc/inetd.conf”, “snort log”, and so forth. For the 
type, please type in ‘E’ for email, ‘P’ for phone calls, ‘H’ for hearing from team 
members (off-line), ‘D’ for discussion (off-line), ‘B’ for  Electronic Bulletin 
Board (ex. Yahoo Messenger), ‘O’ for other type (in case of ‘O’, please indicate 
the type).  
 
Sources Type Number of messages 
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